A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties

Abstract

This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.

The Empirical Argument Against Virtue

“…For the argument that metaphysical/scientific dispositions are best construed as ideal models, seeNathan (2013).18 This claim borders on analyticity, whose problems within an empirical study I will not here treat.19 For a useful discussion of idealized models, seeNathan (2013: Section 4).20 For a fuller characterization of DNA's disposition to be transcribed as RNA, seeNathan (2013: Section 4).…”