2021
DOI: 10.1057/s41295-021-00259-0
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A sovereignist revolution? Italy’s foreign policy under the “Yellow–Green” government

Abstract: In Italy, the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League (LN) formed a coalition government after the legislative elections of March 2018. What has been the actual impact of the populist executive in the Italian foreign policy? Relying on the (few) existing analyses that have developed specific hypotheses on the expected international repercussions of populist parties-ruled governments, the paper examines Italy’s foreign policy under the Italian “Yellow–Green” cabinet (June 2018–August 2019). The manuscr… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Lega also voted against (with the M5S abstaining) on a motion in the European Parliament condemning the attempt to kill the leader of the Russian opposition, Andrey Navalny. M5S and Lega emphasized this point in their Yellow-Green coalition "contract", which portrayed Russia as a partner rather than a menace (Coticchia, 2021). On the whole, all these "Russian sympathizing parties" (Bordignon et al, 2022), illustrate what the literature (Onderco, 2019;Snegovaya, 2021) has defined as "a populist link" with Putin's regime.…”
Section: Populists and Putin Before The Warmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Lega also voted against (with the M5S abstaining) on a motion in the European Parliament condemning the attempt to kill the leader of the Russian opposition, Andrey Navalny. M5S and Lega emphasized this point in their Yellow-Green coalition "contract", which portrayed Russia as a partner rather than a menace (Coticchia, 2021). On the whole, all these "Russian sympathizing parties" (Bordignon et al, 2022), illustrate what the literature (Onderco, 2019;Snegovaya, 2021) has defined as "a populist link" with Putin's regime.…”
Section: Populists and Putin Before The Warmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…The realignment of these two parties' priorities with China's desire for a more robust engagement with Italy was facilitated by the metamorphosis that each experienced in the transition from opposition to national power in 2018 (Coticchia 2021) and catalysed by the new political personnel co-opted to ensure that moderate technocrats in government would be balanced out by anti-establishment technocrats. One of the most representative figures in this second grouping was Mr Michele Geraci, formerly a contract professor of economy and finance at various Chinese universities for over a decade, and now appointed Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Economic Development with responsibility over international trade.…”
Section: Political Personnelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The FN/RN, as many other European radical right and xenophobic populist parties, is positioned around the exclusionary end (Surel 2019 ) and Podemos around the inclusionary one (Font et al 2021 ). Analyses of the M5S highlight a more inconsistent positioning (Coticchia 2021 ; Font et al 2021 ), making it a particularly interesting addition to case selection. On one hand, the M5S shares some preferences with current inclusionary parties in Europe and Latin America especially in terms of opposing international economic elites and supporting (sub)regional integration to protect a largely constructed conception of ‘the people’ (Fossati 2020 ; Wajner 2019 ).…”
Section: Conceptual Framework: Foreign Policy Populism and The Benefi...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most scholars have addressed the specific behaviour of one populist party or leader, typically in one country or on specific foreign policy areas (Cadier 2021 ; Coticchia 2021 ; Verbeek and Zaslove 2014 ; Destradi et al 2021 ; Giurlando 2020 ; Exadaktylos 2020 ). Others have investigated commonalities and differences among ideologically like-minded populists, especially within the radical right (Kane and McCulloch 2017 ; Falk and Stahl 2022 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%