A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

Okumura, Yasunori

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.006

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…First, we derive a student optimal stable matching

μ_{q_{0}}^{*}

of each grade for the given

q_{0}

by using the method introduced by Erdil and Ergin (). Then, for each step k = 1,2, …, we derive a student optimal stable matching of each grade for

q_{k}

that Pareto dominates

μ_{q_{k - 1}}^{*}

by using the method introduced by Okumura (). Through modifying Algorithm 1 by using the two aforementioned methods, we can computationally efficiently derive a matching that satisfies the five requirements even in the case wherein the priorities of the schools are weak.…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan

Okumura

2018

Jpn Econ Rev

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This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and 2 students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We introduce five requirements of a matching and a polynomial‐time algorithm to derive a matching satisfying them. Because the algorithm is inspired by the nursery school system of Yokohama City, we introduce the system and compare it with the algorithm of this study.

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“…First, we derive a student optimal stable matching