A Stealth, Selective, Link-Layer Denial-of-Service Attack Against Automotive Networks

Abstract

Modern vehicles incorporate tens of electronic control units (ECUs), driven by as much as 100,000,000 lines of code. They are tightly interconnected via internal networks, mostly based on the CAN bus standard. Past research showed that, by obtaining physical access to the network or by remotely compromising a vulnerable ECU, an attacker could control even safety-critical inputs such as throttle, steering or brakes. In order to secure current CAN networks from cyberattacks, detection and prevention approaches based on the analysis of transmitted frames have been proposed, and are generally considered the most time-and costeffective solution, to the point that companies have started promoting aftermarket products for existing vehicles. In this paper, we present a selective denial-of-service attack against the CAN standard which does not involve the transmission of any complete frames for its execution, and thus would be undetectable via frame-level analysis. As the attack is based on CAN protocol weaknesses, all CAN bus implementations by all manufacturers are vulnerable. In order to precisely investigate the time, money and expertise needed, we implement an experimental proof-of-concept against a modern, unmodified vehicle and prove that the barrier to entry is extremely low. Finally, we present a discussion of our threat analysis, and propose possible countermeasures for detecting and preventing such an attack.

Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms

“…Given the vulnerabilities of the CAN bus [13], [157], [158], a number of mechanisms have been proposed: (i) encrypting CAN messages and hiding system states to protect against selective DoS attacks [159]; (ii) use of authentication schemes (for both ECUs and CAN messages) to ensure their integrity [160]- [166]; (iii) use of asymmetric cryptography and certificates to authenticate ECUs and share symmetric keys [167]. Researchers have also studied the use of behavioral-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) for invehicle networks.…”

Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges

“…The attacks implemented through the OBD port can be replicated using a malicious node. Palanca et al [11] applied a selective denial-of-service (DoS) attack on an unmodified 2012 Alfa Romeo Giulietta. The research showed that any person who has physical access to the network can disrupt it, even with a simple tool.…”

“…Therefore, extensive studies have been carried out to find possible solutions [7,8] to the vulnerabilities of CAN. Some of these studies have performed successful experimental attacks on passenger cars [9][10][11][12][13][14] and heavy-duty vehicles [15,16]. At the same time, researchers have also proposed preventative methods for such known attacks.…”

Automotive Cybersecurity: Foundations for Next-Generation Vehicles

“…DoS attack As anticipated in Section II-C, flooding the network with the highest priority frames prevents the ECUs from regularly sending their messages, therefore causing a denial of service. An example of this attack is the work by Palanca et al [17].…”