A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election

Schofield, Norman; Zakharov, Alexei

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9483-2

Cited by 31 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…For both countries, our estimations suggest that the low valences of the opposition parties has meant that they have been unable to mount a serious challenge to the government regime. This parallels a result found by Schofield and Zakharov (2010) for the Russia Dumma election of 2007, which showed that there was a similar valence weakness of the parties opposed to United Russia, the party supportive of then President Putin.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 84%

Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

et al. 2011

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 84%

Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

et al. 2011

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“…Even though the necessary condition for convergence is not met, the analysis done in Schofield and Zakharov (2010) shows that Fair Russia, with the lowest valence, maximizes its vote share by remaining close to the electoral mean. This result, however, highlights that unexpected political events could prompt Fair Russia to move from the origin.…”

Section: The 2007 Russian Electionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The analysis carried out in Schofield and Zakharov (2010) concentrates on four parties: the pro-Kremlin United Russia party (ER), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), the Communist Party (CPRF) and the Fair Russia (SR). Voters' ideological preferences were measured using the survey conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center in May 2007.…”

Section: The 2007 Russian Electionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do parties converge to the electoral mean in all political systems?

Gallego

Schofield²

2015

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Many formal models suggest that parties or candidates should locate at the electoral mean. Yet, there is no consistent evidence of such convergence across political systems. Valence Theorem proves that when valence differences across parties are large, there is nonconvergence to the mean. Convergence to the mean depends on the value of the convergence coefficient, c. When c is high there is significant centrifugal tendency acting on the parties and when c is low there is a significant centripetal tendency acting on the parties. In this paper we apply the stochastic valence model of elections in various countries under different political regimes and use the convergence coefficient of these elections to classify political systems. Our results show that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries using the same political system and across political regimes. For countries using proportional representation, namely Israel, Turkey and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high and parties move away from the mean. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and the UK, parties are located at the mean, as the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move but the equilibrium is fragile.

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“…Based on this, 34 The exact wording of the question and descriptions are available in the Appendix. 35 Factor-analytic techniques to estimate policy platforms from these concrete issue item batteries have been used in various articles concerned with spatial voting decisions (see Schofield et al 1998;Schofield and Zakharov 2009;Stoetzer and Zittlau 2015;Quinn, Martin, and Whitford 1999). 36 A more detailed description of the results is provided in the Appendix.…”

Section: Measurement Of Inconsistency and Policy Platforms In The Amementioning

confidence: 99%

A Matter of Representation: Spatial Voting and Inconsistent Policy Preferences

Stoetzer¹

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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The application of spatial voting theories to popular elections presupposes an electorate that chooses political representatives on the basis of their well-structured policy preferences. Behavioral researchers have long contended that parts of the electorate instead hold unstructured and inconsistent policy beliefs. This article proposes an extension to spatial voting theories to analyze the effect of varying consistency in policy preferences on electoral behavior. The model results in the expectation that voters with less consistent policy preferences will put less weight on policy distance when learning about candidates who should represent their political positions. The study tests this expectation for the 2008 US presidential election, and finds that for respondents with less consistent self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale, policy distance less strongly affects their voting decision. The results have implications for the quality of political representation, as certain parts of the electorate are expected to be less closely represented.

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A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election

Abstract: Stochastic model, Election, Russian Duma, H10,

Cited by 31 publications

References 40 publications

Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

Modelling Elections in the Caucasus

Do parties converge to the electoral mean in all political systems?

A Matter of Representation: Spatial Voting and Inconsistent Policy Preferences

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