A Story of Post‐Fordist Exploitation: Financialization and Small‐Scale Maize Farmers in Turkey

Abstract

After the implementation of economic restructuring policies in Turkish agriculture, farming communities experienced significant changes in the patterns of agricultural production over the last decade. The dramatic shift from labor‐intensive field crops to maize farming represents such a change, particularly for small‐scale farmers, since high‐yield maize farming is driven by private agrifood corporate demand. In this article, I explore how this shift influences the relations of production in agriculture through a commodity‐system analysis of the maize sector in Turkey. Through the qualitative analysis of the semistructured in‐depth interviews and secondary data, I find that small‐scale farmers are able to participate in maize farming, even as their dependence on production credits to participate in industrial maize farming crucially reduces their bargaining power with private industry. I argue that the traditional Marxist approach, accumulation by dispossession, is not sufficient to explain the participation of small‐scale farmers. Instead, I propose a new concept, entrepreneurial exploitation, to describe the participation of small‐scale investors in the post‐Fordist regime. Thereby, I point to the important role of expansion of credit markets as a consequence of financialization.

An Inclusive Treadmill? Expansion of Industrial Maize Farming and Simple‐Commodity Producers in Turkey

“…Industrialization compounded by corporatization of agricultural markets even further erodes the bargaining position of simple‐commodity producers without government subsidies. Qualitative findings by Borlu () provide insights on the relative integration of SCPs in IMF: they have a low bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the agrifood corporations because their participation depends on taking on debt to cover the costs of commercial farming for corporate markets.…”

“…Poor farmers encompass tenant farmers and farmers who take on debt to continue farming. Borlu () demonstrates that small‐ and medium‐scale farmers in industrial maize production rely on production credits in the absence of state subsidies. These farmers invest in agricultural production as long as they receive financial returns from farming.…”

Constrained Choice and Climate Change Mitigation in US Agriculture: Structural Barriers to a Climate Change Ethic

“…Contract farming allows companies to limit their liability and to externalize risks (Ashwood et al 2014). Contract farming has emerged in an array of agricultural sectors and regions with negative consequences regarding labor and environmental outcomes (Ashwood et al 2014;Borlu 2015;Burch 1994;Dixon 1999;Goss et al 2001;Mabbett and Carter 1999;Vandergeest et al 1999;Welsh 1997). As seen in in the poultry and leafy green sectors, contracts constrain production choices because companies can stop contracting with farmers who do not comply with the terms of their contracts (Constance and Heffernan 1994;Heffernan and Lind 2000;Stuart 2009).…”

Why Don't They Just Change? Contract Farming, Informational Influence, and Barriers to Agricultural Climate Change Mitigation

“…Across agricultural sectors, contract farming allows corporations and growers to limit liability and externalize risks (Ashwood, Diamond, and Thu 2014) and complicates the role of individual farmers (Pechlaner 2013). Scholars have explored agricultural contracts across a variety of agricultural sectors and geographic regions to highlight the overwhelmingly adverse impacts of contract farming on environmental and labor outcomes (Ashwood et al 2014;Borlu 2015;Burch 1994;Dixon 1982;Goss, Skladany, and Middendorf 2001;Mabbett and Carter 1999;Vandergeest, Flaherty, and Miller 1999;Welsh 1997) and the constraints that contracts place upon farmers' practices (Little and Watts 1994;Stuart 2009;Wells 1981Wells , 1984Wells , 1996Wolf, Hueth, and Ligon 2001). We extend this literature by studying contract farming within corn production, the most common crop grown in the United States (USDA Economic Research Service 2014), by examining specific features of seed-corn contracts that may constraint behavior, and by linking contract production to a specific climate change mitigation behavior.…”