2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_10
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A Strategy for Assessing Safe Use of Sensors in Autonomous Road Vehicles

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Besides the approaches mentioned so far, there are also considerations on perception requirements that aim at complying with the traditional ISO 26262 functional safety standard. The sources [35,52,53] propose dynamically associating an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) with a given driving situation such that for example, the perception is required to comply with the stricter ASIL D in high-risk situations and with the less strict ASIL A in low-risk situations. An example of how functional safety requirements for the perception subsystem can be derived based on a fault tree analysis (FTA) is given in Ref.…”
Section: Concrete Approaches Of Specifying Perceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Besides the approaches mentioned so far, there are also considerations on perception requirements that aim at complying with the traditional ISO 26262 functional safety standard. The sources [35,52,53] propose dynamically associating an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) with a given driving situation such that for example, the perception is required to comply with the stricter ASIL D in high-risk situations and with the less strict ASIL A in low-risk situations. An example of how functional safety requirements for the perception subsystem can be derived based on a fault tree analysis (FTA) is given in Ref.…”
Section: Concrete Approaches Of Specifying Perceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[175]. Similarly, in the ISO 26262 context, it was proposed that the perception subsystem dynamically outputs one world model for each ASIL level such that the planner can dynamically take just that world model that it needs to comply with the ASIL requirement of the current driving situation [35,52,53]. In any of such applications, it is crucial to assure that the reported uncertainties are correctly calibrated (Sect.…”
Section: Uncertainty Tolerancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides the approaches mentioned so far, there are also considerations on perception requirements that aim at complying with the traditional ISO 26262 functional safety standard. The sources [35], [52], [53] propose dynamically associating an Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) with a given driving situation such that for example, the perception is required to comply with the stricter ASIL D in high-risk situations and with the less strict ASIL A in low-risk situations. An example of how functional safety requirements for the perception subsystem can be derived based on a fault tree analysis (FTA) is given in [122] in the context of automated valet parking.…”
Section: A Specification Of Requirements and Criteriamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An overview of self-representation and monitoring of subsystems is given in [175]. Similarly, in the ISO 26262 context, it was proposed that the perception subsystem dynamically outputs one world model for each ASIL level such that the planner can dynamically take just that world model that it needs to comply to the ASIL requirement of the current driving situation [35], [52], [53]. In any of such applications, it is crucial to assure that the reported uncertainties are correctly calibrated (Sec.…”
Section: Further Safety Assurance Activities Regarding Perceptionmentioning
confidence: 99%