A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision

Abstract

The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, a substantial simplification of the ranking information that is necessary to define revisions and contractions uniquely is achieved. This system is, furthermore, expressive enough to capture complex and nontrivial scientific examples. It is thus closely related to a novel research area within belief revision theory which addresses the dynamics of scientific knowledge.

Topological structures of complex belief systems

“…There is no consensus in the literature about the logical form of a belief system . In fact, few attempts have been made to characterize belief bases by formal, logical means.…”

Taking Up Thagard’s Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision

“…[10]). In applying these theories to the problem of scientific change, logicians have focused on mirroring changes in scientific theories as changes in (usually structured) belief sets [3,6,13,20,32]. This belief-centered take on scientific change is exactly the reason why Thagard claims that belief revision theories are not adequate for representing conceptual change [34,35].…”