A Study of EV BMS Cyber Security Based on Neural Network SOC Prediction

Rahman, Syed Mahbubur; Aburub, Haneen; Mekonnen, Yemeserach; Sarwat, Arif I.

doi:10.1109/tdc.2018.8440144

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Nissan responded to the hack by releasing a software patch for the affected vehicles and advising owners to update their cars as soon as possible [29]. In another case, a security specialist was able to hack 25 Tesla cars through their cellular connection and Wi-Fi related to their entertainment systems [30]. A similar attack was reported by the remote hijacking of a Cherokee Jeep being driven on the highway, which was launched via a cybersecurity breach in the control system [31].…”

Section: Cybersecurity Of Bmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical Cloud Battery Management Systems: Review of Security Aspects

et al. 2023

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Battery management systems (BMSs) are critical to ensure the efficiency and safety of high-power battery energy storage systems (BESSs) in vehicular and stationary applications. Recently, the proliferation of battery big data and cloud computing advancements has led to the development of a new generation of BMSs, named Cloud BMS (CBMS), aiming to improve the performance and safety of BESSs. The CBMS is a cyber-physical system with connectivity between the physical BMS and a cloud-based virtual BMS, which is realized through a communication channel such as Internet of Things. Compared to the traditional BMS, the CBMS offers significantly higher computational resources, leveraging the implementation of advanced digital twin models and best-in-class algorithms in the BMS software, which will provide superior performances. However, as for any other CPS, the CBMS creates vulnerabilities against cyberattacks and if not properly secured, could end up damaging the BESS and/or causing dangerous, expensive, and life-threatening situations. Cybersecurity of the CBMSs has thus become a trending topic and several works have been published in this area in recent years. This paper conducts a scoping review to address different topics related to BMS cybersecurity. The CBMS architecture is presented, and the potential cyberattack surfaces are identified. Different possible attack scenarios, including attack points, attack types, and their impact at the component level (BMS and BESS) and system level (vehicle or grid), are discussed. In addition, the paper provides a review of potential countermeasures to protect the CBMS against cyberattacks. The paper also includes a review of the applicable standards and regulations that relate to this trending topic. Finally, based on the reviewed gaps, potential future research domains on BMS cybersecurity topics are identified and presented at the end of the paper.

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Section: Cybersecurity Of Bmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical Cloud Battery Management Systems: Review of Security Aspects

et al. 2023

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“…Effects on the grid from the manipulation of EV batteries were also surveyed in [29], and some of the same security concerns could apply to gridconnected batteries, while others are specific to the vehicle-charger interaction at public charging stations, which does not apply to grid-connected batteries. Even neural networks have been proposed to attack EV state-of-charge [30]. More potential attack vectors for EVs are discussed in [31].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

Culler

Burroughs

2021

Energies

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The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

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“…In [32], a cyber-physical interaction of various components of EVSE is provided with the classification of associated vulnerabilities and cyber-physical threats. Cybersecurity of the battery management system of PEVs has been considered in [33] through a neural network-based approach that estimates state of charge (SOC) of a battery under cyberattacks. However, the work in [33] does not address the cybersecurity concern from the perspective of the charging management system.…”

Section: Literature Survey On Cybersecurity Of Scmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cybersecurity of the battery management system of PEVs has been considered in [33] through a neural network-based approach that estimates state of charge (SOC) of a battery under cyberattacks. However, the work in [33] does not address the cybersecurity concern from the perspective of the charging management system. Although the aforementioned literature studied some insights into the cybersecurity-related concerns, there are still several areas of charging management systems that are unexplored; therefore, further research is needed.…”

Section: Literature Survey On Cybersecurity Of Scmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity of Electric Vehicle Smart Charging Management Systems

Bhusal¹,

Gautam²,

Benidris³

2020

Preprint

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In concept, a smart charging management system (SCMS) optimizes the charging of plug-in vehicles (PEVs) and provides various grid services including voltage control, frequency regulation, peak shaving, renewable energy integration support, spinning reserve, and emergency demand response. These functionalities largely depend upon data collected from various entities such as PEVs, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), service providers, and utilities. SCMS can be susceptible to both cyber and physical threats (e.g. man-in-the-middle attack, data intrigued attack, denial of charging, physical-attack) due to interactions of and interdependencies between cyber and physical components. Cyber-physical threats through highly connected malware vectors raise various concerns including public safety hazards to vehicle operators and those in the immediate vicinity as well as disruptions to electric grid operations. This paper describes the concept of SCMS and provides a comprehensive review of cybersecurity aspects of EVSEs and SCMSs with their possible impacts on the power grid and society. It also contributes to the development of cybersecurity measures to the SCMSs. Various functions of SCMS are reviewed in detail including peak shaving, demand charge reduction, frequency regulation, spinning reserve, renewable integration support, distribution congestion management, reactive power compensation, and emergency demand response with unidirectional PEVs charging. Also, a critical literature survey on current practices of SCMS cybersecurity is provided to explore major impacts and challenges of cyber-physical attacks and to identify research gaps and vulneraibilities in currently available SCMSs technologies.Index Terms-Cybersecurity, cyber-physical threats, PEV and grid service, and smart charging management systems.

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A Study of EV BMS Cyber Security Based on Neural Network SOC Prediction

Cited by 12 publications

References 7 publications

Cyber-Physical Cloud Battery Management Systems: Review of Security Aspects

Cyber-Physical Cloud Battery Management Systems: Review of Security Aspects

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

Cybersecurity of Electric Vehicle Smart Charging Management Systems

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