A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

Altman, Eitan; Bernhard, Pierre; Kesidis, George; Rojas-Mora, Julio; Wong, Sulan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1654306

Cited by 14 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…In the push interaction, however, there are multiple followers, hence it is different than traditional Stackelberg game. 9 High price sensitivity indicates that demand will decrease (increase, resp.) at a high rate with an increase (decrease, resp.)…”

Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also characterize the interaction between the IoTSP and advertisers and investigate the optimal price that the IoTSP should quote to the advertisers. This enables us to characterize the demand of end-users and the payoffs of the providers in all the possible advertisement revenue regime which have not been studied in [9] and [13]. Moreover, the hybrid interaction model can only arise when there are more than two different kinds of providers in the system as in the IoT.…”

Section: E Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Pricing for profit in internet of things

Ghosh

Sarkar

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

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The economic model of the Internet of Things (IoT) consists of end users, advertisers and three different kinds of providers-IoT service provider (IoTSP), Wireless service provider (WSP) and cloud service provider (CSP). We investigate three different kinds of interactions among the providers. First, we consider that the IoTSP prices a bundled service to the end-users, and the WSP and CSP pay the IoTSP (push model). Next, we consider the model where the end-users independently pay the each provider (pull model). Finally, we consider a hybrid model of the above two where the IoTSP and WSP quote their prices to the end-users, but the CSP quotes its price to the IoTSP.We model different kinds of interaction among the providers as a combination of sequential and parallel non-cooperative games. We characterize and quantify the impact of the advertisement revenue on the equilibrium pricing strategy and payoff of providers, and corresponding demands of end users in each of the above interaction models. Our analysis reveals that the demand of end-users, and the payoffs of the providers are non decreasing functions of the advertisement revenue. For sufficiently high advertisement revenue, the IoTSP will offer its service free of cost in each interaction model. However, the payoffs of the providers, and the demand of end-users vary across different interaction models. Our analysis shows that the demand of end-users, and the payoff of the WSP are the highest in the pull (push, resp.) model in the low (high, resp.) advertisement revenue regime. The payoff of the IoTSP is always higher in the pull model irrespective of the advertisement revenue. The payoff of the CSP is the highest in the hybrid model in the low advertisement revenue regime. However, in the high advertisement revenue regime the payoff of the CSP in the hybrid model or in the push model can be higher depending on the equilibrium chosen in the push model.A part of this paper was presented in ISIT'15 [1]. The authors are with the Electrical and Systems Engg.

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Section: B Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: E Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing for profit in internet of things

Ghosh

Sarkar

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

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“…[ Altman et al 2010a] noted that if p d is controlled by either of the players and is set jointly with that player's access price, then the price competition between the ISP and the CP results in zero demand at equilibrium, which is not favorable to any of the agents. This motivates us to study the case when p d is set by a neutral third party whom we refer to as 'regulator'.…”

Section: The Case Of a Single Cp And A Single Ispmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is natural, of course, yet pleasing to see that the model bears this out. (3) If either of the agents has control over p d and sets it jointly with its access price, the equilibrium demand is zero [Altman et al 2010a]. None of the parties benefit from this situation.…”

Section: The Case Of a Single Cp And A Single Ispmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It merely affects the way in which the payment by the internauts is split between CP i and the ISP. The mere fact that the regulator fixed some p d (under ex ante regulation) suffices to get an equilibrium more favorable than the case when p d is under the control of one of the players and is jointly set with that player's access price [Altman et al 2010a].…”

Section: Ex Ante Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regulation of Off-Network Pricing in a Nonneutral Network

Altman

Hanawal

Sundaresan

2014

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

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Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the "network neutrality" principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and in particular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a "cooperative" one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the ISP. We also study two dynamic game models and study the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

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