2017
DOI: 10.13089/jkiisc.2017.27.1.67
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A Study on API Wrapping in Themida and Unpacking Technique

Abstract: A protector is a software for protecting core technologies by using compression and encryption. Nowadays malwares use the protector to conceal the malicious code from the analysis. For detailed analysis of packed program, unpacking the protector is a necessary procedure. Lately, most studies focused on finding OEP to unpack the program. However, in this case, it would be difficult to analyze the program because of the limits to remove protecting functions by finding OEP. In this paper, we studied about the pro… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“… Themida VerifierIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated by Themida or not. If the input program is not obfuscated by Themida, abort the analyzing process. Anti‐Analysis DetectorIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated with anti‐analysis options provided by Themida. API‐Wrapping DetectorIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated with the API‐Wrapping option by monitoring the NtAllocateVirtualMemory API with RWE (Read/Write/Execute) permission ( Rule 3‐2 ). API‐Wrapping UnWrapperIf an input program is obfuscated with API‐Wrapping , it unwraps the original API address by monitoring the source/destination address of the API code copy instruction. The unwrapped address (original API address) is recorded to the unwrap‐log to complement the IAT‐log ( Rule 3‐2 ). IAT DetectorIt determines where the IAT existed by using memory write monitoring at the top section ( Rule 1‐1 ) and records the IAT‐log. Direct Call & Jump DetectorIt records locations of direct call/jump statements and its indirect addresses for converting a direct call/jump into an indirect call/jump ( Rule 2‐3 ). Original EntryPoint CheckerIt determines whether an input program is executed at the unpacked code section to record the OEP ( Rule 4‐3 ). Original Code & Data ExtractorIt extracts code and data immediately after jumping to the unpacked code section ( Rule 2‐4 ). …”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“… Themida VerifierIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated by Themida or not. If the input program is not obfuscated by Themida, abort the analyzing process. Anti‐Analysis DetectorIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated with anti‐analysis options provided by Themida. API‐Wrapping DetectorIt determines whether an input program is obfuscated with the API‐Wrapping option by monitoring the NtAllocateVirtualMemory API with RWE (Read/Write/Execute) permission ( Rule 3‐2 ). API‐Wrapping UnWrapperIf an input program is obfuscated with API‐Wrapping , it unwraps the original API address by monitoring the source/destination address of the API code copy instruction. The unwrapped address (original API address) is recorded to the unwrap‐log to complement the IAT‐log ( Rule 3‐2 ). IAT DetectorIt determines where the IAT existed by using memory write monitoring at the top section ( Rule 1‐1 ) and records the IAT‐log. Direct Call & Jump DetectorIt records locations of direct call/jump statements and its indirect addresses for converting a direct call/jump into an indirect call/jump ( Rule 2‐3 ). Original EntryPoint CheckerIt determines whether an input program is executed at the unpacked code section to record the OEP ( Rule 4‐3 ). Original Code & Data ExtractorIt extracts code and data immediately after jumping to the unpacked code section ( Rule 2‐4 ). …”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It determines whether an input program is obfuscated with the API‐Wrapping option by monitoring the NtAllocateVirtualMemory API with RWE (Read/Write/Execute) permission ( Rule 3‐2 ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since commercial obfuscation tools such as Dexguard [19], VMprotect [20], Themida [21], and Dexprotector [22] are available in the market, attackers can easily obfuscate malware by using them. However, there has not been a complete study on the automated deobfuscation against such commercial obfuscation tools [23].…”
Section: Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%