A Study on Recycle Schedules for Trade-In Rebates With Consideration of Product Life Cycle

Huang, Yeu‐Shiang; Lin, Chuan; Fang, Chih‐Chiang

doi:10.1109/tem.2018.2840104

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Strategic planning and recovering and remanufacturing decisions between a manufacturer and remanufacturer are discussed under different situations such as period-dependent settings, subsidy and take-back laws, and technology licensing [55,[128][129][130][131][132][133][134][135][136][137]. There are efforts to derive Nash equilibrium when there is competition between two independent manufacturers considering trade-in strategy [138], market segmentation [139], local and non-local manufacturing [140], product life cycle [141], recycling choice [142], to name a few. Competition between a retailer and manufacturer through a Nash framework is addressed by the retailer reselling refurbished cell phones in the second-hand markets [143], contracting reverse revenue sharing [89], and influencing government intervention [144].…”

Section: Game-based Clscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Two-period models are also formulated to include a trade-in option. In the first period, consumers buy the new products, while in the second period, they can choose to continue using the used product or replace it through trade-ins [3,138,141,247]. The motivations for proposing the second period include introducing an upgraded version of a product [251], consideration of a warranty period [238], selling separation of new and remanufactured items as online and offline channels, respectively [85], selling remanufactured products at another loca-tion [202], cores supply limitation in the second period [139], the effect of quality in the first and second periods [259], and studying cannibalization issues [148].…”

Section: Planning Horizonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the usual forward and reverse channels, more details are illustrated using different arrows. In some CLSCs, new and remanufactured products are sold to the customers either through different channels [151,153,249,258] (for example, see Structures 52,123,151, and 165 in Figure 7) or different parties [83,152,246,264] (for example, see Structures 105,141,156, and 162 in Figure 7). Few models considered the landfill effect shown with the black arrow [13,207,230] (see Structures 118,129, and 136 in Figure 7).…”

Section: Clsc Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analyzing the Structure of Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Game Theory Perspective

Shekarian

Flapper

2021

Sustainability

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Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) are seen as one of the circular economy’s leading approaches for reducing our natural environment load. Many CLSC models require collaboration among different parties. Game theory (GT) offers a way to consider the profits of all parties in a CLSC, providing insight into the costs and benefits to the involved parties in an objective and quantitative way. Presently, available reviews on the use of GT, in the context of CLSC, are quite limited and consider only a few relevant elements. Here, we present a new and more extensive framework, focusing on the collaboration structure of CLSCs. It contains a content-based analysis of 230 papers based on a four-step systematic literature review process. The characteristics studied are channels for collection, reprocessing and selling, the planning horizon, and the types of games. The structures found are graphically reviewed, leading to 196 different structures. The results show that, so far, most attention has been paid to the dual-channel collection, where collection by two retailers (dual-retailer) is the most studied case. With respect to selling, most attention has been paid to situations with two selling channels (dual-selling), i.e., one channel managed by a manufacturer and one channel managed by a remanufacturer. Studies have prioritized the role of manufacturers as that of the leader and collector. Finally, a number of directions for further research are pointed out.

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Section: Game-based Clscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Planning Horizonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Clsc Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analyzing the Structure of Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Game Theory Perspective

Shekarian

Flapper

2021

Sustainability

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“…Zhu, Wang, Chen, and Chen (2016) examined the effect of implementing trade-ins by only one or two firms in a duopoly situation and showed that adopting trade-ins could bring competitive advantage. Huang, Lin, and Fang (2019) considered both fixed timing and continuous period recycling strategies for trade-in rebates under a duopoly market. They determined threshold values of the key parameters that have significant impacts on the recycling strategies of the manufacturer.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Upstream or Downstream: Who Should Provide Trade‐in Services in Dyadic Supply Chains?*

Tang

Ding

et al. 2020

Decision Sciences

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As observed in real-world practices, trade-ins can be offered by either the manufacturer or the retailer. The party offering the trade-in program faces the trade-off between the fixed trade-in cost incurred and the additional revenue generated. By conducting a game-theoretic study, we analytically explore in this article the optimal choice of tradein provider in a dyadic supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We show that the trade-in models can bear a much higher manufacturing cost and induce a higher new product sale than the benchmark case without trade-ins. It is possible that both the manufacturer and retailer prefer to undertake the trade-in program, which would lead to a conflict; or both firms prefer to be a free rider instead of being the trade-in provider, which would fall into a prisoner's dilemma. Moreover, the powerful manufacturer has an incentive to delegate the trade-in service to the retailer when facing a higher fixed trade-in cost, but the delegation option is always worse off for the retailer compared to the scenario in which the retailer provides trade-ins by herself. We also show that the trade-in scenarios always benefit the environment and consumers of the replacement segment, but hurt the primary segment consumers. The social welfare would actually be higher in the scenarios with trade-ins if the fixed trade-in cost is relatively low and the residual value of old products is relatively high. [

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“…Remanufacturing is the highest degree of product recovery method as it upgrades the used products to the quality standard of new products (Raz et al, 2017;Huang et al, 2019). It has been a prominent business in the United States and has also been lately implemented by the organizations in European nations due to its profitable nature and legislative regulations being imposed by the European Union (EU) (Östlin et al, 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Barriers to Closed-Loop Supply Chain: A Case of the Indian Automotive Industry

Bhatia

Jakhar

Dora

2022

IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage.

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Closed loop supply chain (CLSC) implementation has become imperative for organizations owing to resource scarcity and generation of toxic waste. However, CLSC implementation can be very challenging due to several barriers, especially in an emerging manufacturing hub such as India. This research identifies and analyzes the prominent barriers to CLSC implementation in the Indian automotive sector. Further, the paper also examines causal relationships between the barriers. A total of 22 barriers to CLSC implementation are identified from literature and subsequently, validated by industry experts. The finalized barriers are then evaluated by Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and grey-Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) techniques. The study provides managers and policy makers with insights on the most prominent and causal barriers, and recommends strategies to overcome these barriers. The findings will help managers to frame short-term and long-term strategies to mitigate barriers to CLSC and contribute towards successful implementation of CLSC.

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A Study on Recycle Schedules for Trade-In Rebates With Consideration of Product Life Cycle

Cited by 23 publications

References 43 publications

Analyzing the Structure of Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Game Theory Perspective

Analyzing the Structure of Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Game Theory Perspective

Upstream or Downstream: Who Should Provide Trade‐in Services in Dyadic Supply Chains?*

Analysis of Barriers to Closed-Loop Supply Chain: A Case of the Indian Automotive Industry

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