A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance

Lewis, David

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14

Cited by 464 publications

(355 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…So, there is nothing in the story to change this." thus we run into issues about the Principal Principle, the relation between objective and subjective probabilities, and the hidden ways of admissible and inadmissible information in the sense of Lewis (1980). However, this is a red herring, for both sides.…”

Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Lewis (2001), who triggered the entire debate by contradicting Elga (2000), turns the tables and states that precisely because of this argument its premise P Mo (H) = 1/2 must be wrong. His suggestion, as elaborated by Bradley (2011: 403-406), is this: In assuming P Mo (H) = 1/2 Elga (2000: 145) apparently relies on the Principal Principle according to which your credence for H should agree with the chance of H-provided, Lewis warns, the information one has in P Mo is admissible in the sense of Lewis (1980). and Bradley argues that it is indeed inadmissible: if the information that now is tuesday is inadmissible, as it clearly is, then the information that now is monday must be inadmissible as well.…”

Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Temporal Self-Location and Forgetfulness

Spohn¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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this paper deals with the epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal selflocation and forgetfulness in probabilistic terms. after explicitly stating the underlying algebraic or propositional framework, it proposes two rules of probability change through our inner sense of time and generally describes how conditionalization works with respect to indexical information. It suggests a rule for rearranging beliefs after forgetting (and other unfavorable epistemic changes). after rehearsing standard auto-epistemology in terms of the reflection principle and its consequences, it moreover studies the auto-epistemology of those non-standard epistemological changes. thus, it generalizes the reflection principle to the indexical case and to an even more general version that is free from the informal restrictions that are commonly assumed. all these principles are illustrated with various examples: the prisoner, the new riddle of induction, Sleeping Beauty, and finally Shangri-La.

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Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Third Application: Sleeping Beautymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Temporal Self-Location and Forgetfulness

Spohn¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…There are various ways to formulate causal decision theory, but, like Skyrms (1980;1984) and Lewis (1981), I think that the most plausible formulations are those in terms of chance. 5 If we assume that agents are always rationally certain that each of their options has a nonzero present chance of being chosen (as I will, hereafter), then we can formulate causal decision theory in terms of conditional chance.…”

Section: The Rule Of U-maximizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Crystal Balls

Spencer

2018

Nous

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“…According to David Lewis's 'Principal Principle' rational degrees of belief are expectations of objective chances, at least when objective chances are known to exist. 22 It tells us to align degrees of belief with chances. The result of a toss of a fair coin is a matter of objective chance.…”

Section: Second Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Luck and Decision

Barrett

2006

J Applied Philosophy

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Much recent work on moral responsibility and on distributive justice has addressed the concept of luck. Very little attention has been given to the relation of luck to rationality. How does luck bear on our choices? Can beliefs about luck lead to unwise decisions? These questions have particular relevance for understanding gambling behaviour, and for public policy on gambling. In this paper I argue that no one is reliably lucky, and that projecting luck can undermine rational decision-making. I give various examples to show the conceptual connection between luck and unpredictability. I present an a posteriori conception of projectibility, and argue that because lucky events are rationally unexpected, regularity statements about luck fail to satisfy the conditions of projectibility. I reject the claim that 'lucky' is a dispositional term, and thus projectible, on the ground that a dispositional interpretation leads to contradiction. I then defend my claim that luck is not projectible against three objections. I conclude with some thoughts about rational responses to luck, using gambling as an illustration.Daniel Dennett calls luck a 'curious concept'. 1 Susan Hurley endorses Dennett's view, adding 'treacherous'. 2 Both remark that Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, in their work on moral luck, take the concept of luck more or less for granted. 3 Hurley and Dennett, in contrast, see a need to look closely at luck, in order to understand its bearing on the nature and scope of responsibility.Luck also bears on rationality. As Dennett points out, people often appear to believe that luck is a 'projectible property of people or things'. 4 Such beliefs often inform predictions about future events. People project luck. I will argue that doing this reflects confusion about luck, and can undermine rational decision making.Dennett claims that 'luck is mere luck, not a genuine projectible endowment'. 5 He doesn't defend this claim in detail, but tells a story that he thinks makes it so obvious that it doesn't need further justification. He mentions the sort of circumstances that might lead people to think of luck as 'something real', 6 but not why they misconceive luck in doing so.Many people act as if luck is projectible. We should be alert to the presence of wishful thinking, of wanting luck to be projectible. But we should also recognise the common belief that some of us are lucky and others not, and that people project luck on the basis of that belief. I agree with Dennett that we ought not to project luck. But rather than just pointing out that common attitudes towards luck are often confused, I want to show why luck is not projectible. 7 As well as its theoretical interest, the relationship between beliefs about luck and rational decision making has practical significance. My research on the ethics of gambling has made me recognise the need to look closely at the rationality of beliefs about luck, and that in turn requires work on the theory of luck. Many gamblers form beliefs 74 W. Barrett

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A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance

Cited by 464 publications

References 6 publications

The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Temporal Self-Location and Forgetfulness

The Epistemology and Auto-Epistemology of Temporal Self-Location and Forgetfulness

No Crystal Balls

Luck and Decision

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