2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.02.001
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A survey on authentication schemes in VANETs for secured communication

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Cited by 223 publications
(118 citation statements)
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“…In short, all messages broadcasted in each region should pass through corresponding LTA for verification process. In addition, Ref [7] categorised authentication schemes in VANET and analyzed properties of the conventional schemes. The schemes are classified depending on the approaches such as cryptography, sign and verification.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In short, all messages broadcasted in each region should pass through corresponding LTA for verification process. In addition, Ref [7] categorised authentication schemes in VANET and analyzed properties of the conventional schemes. The schemes are classified depending on the approaches such as cryptography, sign and verification.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in various applications of the future vehicle connected networks, users are extremely sensitive to delay requirements. For applications such as collision warning and departure warning, if the task is migrated to the base station, the task migration method in which the base station performs the task and then returns the results will inevitably increase the network delay [23]. Although a hybrid communication solution that combines V2V and V2I functionality will inherently provide the most efficient and powerful solution, purely infrastructure-based communication will not limit the application level of data distribution and processing to a specific centralized architecture.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… Message spoofing: the attacker sends bogus messages in order to disseminate fake information and to deceive other vehicles decisions (Ahmed & Elhadef, ). Message replay attack: The attacker injects back the received packet into the network in order to poison the location table. Impersonation attack: A malicious vehicle pretends to be another vehicle by using wrong identity (Manvi & Tangade, ). Movement tracking: Allow peer vehicles, service providers, authentication servers, and other infrastructure to track a given vehicle (Kang, Lin, Jiang, & Bertino, ). Sybil attack: a malicious vehicle sends wrong numerous messages to other vehicles with different fabricated identities. Hence, legitimate vehicles think they are dealing with different vehicles whereas it is only one vehicle. Cheating with position info: falsifying its own position allows the malicious node to create additional identifiers or blocking other vehicles from receiving important messages (Al Junaid et al, ). ID disclosure: a node in the network discloses the identity of neighbors, tracks the current location of a target node, and uses this data for a range of purposes (La & Cavalli, ). Usurpation of the identity of a node: a malicious node spoofs the identity of another node. …”
Section: Vanets Security Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%