A Tale of Two Cities

Abstract

Despite increasing evidence of greatly differentiated illicit drug markets, common depictions and conceptualizations of ''the'' drug market remain subject to overhomogenization. As regards drug market-related violence, the conceptualization of drug supply milieu as generally violent has often (sometimes unintentionally) been apparently supported by case study research reporting from particularly violent supply milieu and/or on specific groups of suppliers. Little research has focused on the relative absence of violence in supply milieu. Although some prior research has pointed toward ways in which levels of drug market violence can differ, few examples have shown this empirically by reference to comparative case studies and none have attempted to relate this to differentiation as opposed to market emergence, maturity, and decline. This article reports on two case studies of established heroin/crack markets in two separate coastal cities in England that share many characteristics but differ meaningfully in regard to drug market violence. Meaningful historical and extant differences in supply-related violence is reported and reflected upon and it is concluded that drugrelated violence, rather than conforming to conventional notions privileging structural or systemic similarity, is contingent on a mix of local supply cultures, supplier rationality, local supply structures as well as supplier characteristics and that each and any supply locale is likely, if studied closely, to differ in meaningful respects across time and practice to another.

The transparency paradox. Building trust, resolving disputes and optimising logistics on conventional and online drugs markets

“…There is evidence about the general structures of the global trade (e.g., Reuter & Trautmann, 2009), mid-range dealing (e.g., Pearson & Hobbs, 2001), retail sales in hard drugs markets (e.g., Coomber & Maher, 2006) as well as among networks of recreational users (e.g., Jacques & Allen, 2014), including the phenomenon of non-profit-driven "social supply" (e.g., Coomber & Turnbull, 2007), to name just a few. In addition, conventional drug markets can be differentiated into "open" and "closed" markets (Coomber, 2015;Hough & Natarajan, 2000).…”

“…Within "open" markets, dealers are more visible to potential customers as well as more exposed to violence. Due to the higher visibility, sellers are at greater risk of being arrested by law enforcement agencies (Coomber, 2015;Coomber & Moyle, 2013). DNMs for drugs can also be regarded as "open" markets, especially because this is defined by the "technical organisation" (Hough & Natarajan 2000, 4) of the market, although not all characteristics can be applied to DNMs, e.g.…”

“…a higher exposure of violence. Moreover, conventional drug markets are highly differentiated in terms of time, space, and populations and show varying degrees of violence and trust as, for example, Coomber (2006Coomber ( , 2015, Reuter (2009), Hough & Natarajan (2000) point out. In sum, law enforcement agencies may have at least an idea of the identities of some types of dealers and their customers (Skolnick et al, 1990, Coomber, 2006.…”

Brune Og Hvide Bude

“…I modsaetning til folkelige forståelser, som ofte antager, at stofmarkedet er en monolitisk entitet, har meget nyere forskning peget på, at stofmarkeder varierer både vertikalt mellem markedsniveauer (top-, mellem-og detailniveau) og inden for det samme markedsniveau (Coomber 2015). I denne artikel har jeg zoomet ind på ét specifikt detailmarked, som man kan kalde for det telefonbaserede budservicemarked for illegale rusmidler.…”

Can Professional Interventions Contribute to an Escalation in Cases of Youth Violence? Considering the Impact of the Shift from Informal to Formal Youth Support on an Inner City Housing Estate

“…Local drug markets have become saturated with more young people selling drugs to make quick money, without the customer base expanding (Andell and Pitts, 2018; Robinson et al, 2018; Windle and Briggs, 2015). At the same time, enforcement efforts within provincial areas of the United Kingdom have reduced the local dealing market, creating a void (Andell and Pitts, 2018; Coomber, 2015). London-based dealers have, therefore, looked for entrepreneurial opportunities to maximise profits and expand their drug operations into this void, through developing county lines drug networks (Andell and Pitts, 2018; Coomber, 2015; Pitts, 2016; Robinson et al, 2018; Windle and Briggs, 2015; Windle et al, 2020).…”