A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity

Panchanathan, Karthik; Boyd, Robert

doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1

Cited by 334 publications

(393 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This is an important issue, as it allows to investigate the competition of different 'moral systems'. In particular, this approach no longer makes use of the assumption that one player acts as a referee whose public assessment is adopted by all other players (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004;Pacheco et al, 2006;Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). It is common-day experience that different people can assess one and the same action in different ways.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With a certain probability , they fail to implement an intended help. Following Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), Iwasa (2004, 2006) and Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), we assume that an intended refusal is always carried out (see also Fishman et al (2001), Fishman (2003) and Lotem et al (1999)). Finally, we assume that from time to time, a randomly chosen individual switches strategy by adopting the strategy i of a model chosen with a probability proportional to that model's fitness F i = (1 − s)F + sP i .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For this, two requirements are needed: (a) information about previous interactions, even those in which one has not been involved; and (b) an assessment of these interactions. Thus indirect reciprocity is based on constant monitoring of the other members of the population, and on judging whether they deserve to be helped or not, or in other words whether they have a good image or not (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001;Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, b;Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). This can be viewed as an elementary form of moral judgment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…The contrite tit-for-tat strategy, for example, enables quick recovery from error by preventing player A from defecting when player B defects from A's initial unintended defection. Errors of perception and implementation are also important in models of indirect reciprocity (e.g., Leimar and Hammerstein 2001;Panchanathan and Boyd 2003). The costly consequences of misperceiving signals implies that adaptations for signaling should produce signals with a high signal-to-noise ratio, and adaptations for signal reception should effectively distinguish signals from noise.…”

Section: Noisementioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity

Hess

Hagen

2006

Hum Nat

113

105

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Evolutionary models of human cooperation are increasingly emphasizing the role of reputation and the requisite truthful "gossiping" about reputation-relevant behavior. If resources were allocated among individuals according to their reputations, competition for resources via competition for "good" reputations would have created incentives for exaggerated or deceptive gossip about oneself and one's competitors in ancestral societies. Correspondingly, humans should have psychological adaptations to assess gossip veracity. Using social psychological methods, we explored cues of gossip veracity in four experiments. We found that simple reiteration increased gossip veracity, but only for those who found the gossip relatively uninteresting. Multiple sources of gossip increased its veracity, as did the independence of those sources. Information that suggested alternative, benign interpretations of gossip decreased its veracity. Competition between a gossiper and her target decreased gossip veracity. These results provide preliminary evidence for psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity, mechanisms that might be used to assess veracity in other domains involving social exchange of information.

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“…In other words, their history of moves is given as public information, whose accessibility is limited only by their memory spans. Moreover, we set aside other public information such as social standing, which is required in Contrite TFT [22,23,24,25] as well as in some form of indirect reciprocity [26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. After deriving our main results under these assumptions, we will revisit the problem of perception error.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Baek

Choi

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

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A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity

Cited by 334 publications

References 15 publications

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

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