2016
DOI: 10.1111/1467-923x.12286
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A Tale of Two Referendums: 1975 and 2016

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Cited by 26 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The point of departure used for the shorter time frame is the return of the Conservatives to office in May 2010. Contrary to those who insist that Cameron precipitated an unnecessary crisis of Britain's membership by calling an avoidable referendum (Glencross, 2016;Saunders, 2016;Vail, 2015), I argue that the underlying structural forces generated by Britain's singular macro-political economy created a relatively high degree of probability that the denouement of Britain's membership of the EU would be reached under the conditions of the Conservative party being in office.…”
contrasting
confidence: 60%
“…The point of departure used for the shorter time frame is the return of the Conservatives to office in May 2010. Contrary to those who insist that Cameron precipitated an unnecessary crisis of Britain's membership by calling an avoidable referendum (Glencross, 2016;Saunders, 2016;Vail, 2015), I argue that the underlying structural forces generated by Britain's singular macro-political economy created a relatively high degree of probability that the denouement of Britain's membership of the EU would be reached under the conditions of the Conservative party being in office.…”
contrasting
confidence: 60%
“…For many years, the EU was 'the dog that didn't bark' in British electoral politics. Labour itself was somewhat hostile to joining the European Economic Community before and after the 1975 referendum, but Harold Wilson, the leader of the party in government, successfully obtained strong support for staying in the EEC (Saunders 2016 (Billig 1978;Fielding 1981). 2 In general, there was little sign of a new electoral alignment along a social dimension of political competition (Heath et al 1990).…”
Section: The Emergence Of the Pre-conditions For Dimensional Realignmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a way, Cameron gambled what he regarded to be Britain’s economic future on an always rather tenuous strategy for re-uniting his party – and one that failed so spectacularly that it ended up costing him his own job and which still threatens to split the party today. Yet in so doing, he was arguably not entirely unlike Harold Wilson in 1975 (see also Saunders, 2016). But what Wilson got right, Cameron got catastrophically wrong – in large part because of the rather different political context in which their respective forms of brinkmanship were played out.…”
Section: The Making Of the Vote For Brexitmentioning
confidence: 99%