A terrorism-based differential game: Nash differential game

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the problem of combating terrorism by the government, which is one of the most serious problems that direct governments and countries. We formulate the problem and use the Nash approach of a differential game to obtain the optimal strategies for combating terrorism. We study the relationship between each of the government’ strategies and terrorism when the government is on the defensive (reactive), and we study when the government expects terrorist attacks and develops its strategies to combat terrorism. Also, we study the relationship between government activity and its strategies as well as government activity and the strategy of terrorist organizations.

Toward the Nash Equilibrium Solutions for Large-Scale Pentagonal Fuzzy Continuous Static Games

“…Due to the additively separable structure of function in problem (24), it can be decomposed into the following two subproblems with F 22 ð2Þ as the coordinating parameter.…”

“…In addition, they have discussed their properties, such as their idempotency, monotonicity boundedness, and shift invariance. Recently, there are enormous papers introduced to deal with the Nash equilibrium for solving the CSG (for instance, [22], [23], [24], [25,26], [27], and [28]).…”

On Stackelberg Leader with Min-Max Followers to Solve Fuzzy Continuous Static Games

“…Khalifa and Kumar [21] investigated cooperative continuous static games in a crisp environment, defining and determining the first-kind stability set corresponding to the solution without differentiability. Under uncertainty environment, some recent researchers for cooperative games have been introduced (Mallozzi and Messalli [22], Bigdeli and Hassanpour [23], Elshafei [24], Zaichenko [25], Zidan et al [26], Donahue et al [27], Ganzfried [28], Zhou et al [29], Krishankumar et al [30,31], Tukhtasinov et al [32], Sivagami et al [33], Zhao et al [34], Megahed [35], Romanuke [36], and Khalifa et al [37]).…”