A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality

Jeanne, Olivier; Ostry, Jonathan D.; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1316704

Cited by 10 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 22 publications

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“…Implicit ex ante conditionality is appropriate. To reward past good policies, multilaterals should lend more and more freely than in the past, provided that such support should be accompanied by appropriate monitoring to ensure that policies remain on track and support is productive (Jeanne, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer, 2008). Countries with sizable debts that are able to commit to policies of fiscal discipline in the future and save in the subsequent boom phase of the cycle should receive higher levels of financing on account of their enhanced fiscal sustainability.…”

Section: D) a Country With More Serious Sustainability Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility

Rebucci,

Powell,

Fernández-Arias

2009

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The paper reviews the case for a strong multilateral response to the global crisis in emerging markets (EMs). It discusses modalities and feasibility of intervention and its associated risks, depending on country circumstances of fiscal space and liquidity needs. The specific role of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in ensuring the development effectiveness of the fiscal response is also discussed. The paper concludes by highlighting the international financial architecture issues raised by the global crisis that cannot be addressed immediately but will need to be dealt with once the current crisis has been tamed.

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Section: D) a Country With More Serious Sustainability Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility

Rebucci,

Powell,

Fernández-Arias

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Recent Trends and Ambiguities of Conditionality as an Instrument of the EU Internal Governance

Fasone,

Simoncini

2024

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

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What do we know about the global financial safety net? A new comprehensive data set

Scheubel

Stracca

2019

Journal of International Money and Finance

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This paper critically reviews the theoretical basis for the provision of the global financial safety net (GFSN) and provide a comprehensive database covering four elements of the GFSN (foreign exchange reserves, IMF financing, central bank swap lines and regional financing arrangements) for over 150 countries in the sample period 1960-2015. This paper also presents some key stylised facts regarding the provision of GFSN financing and compares macroeconomic outcomes in capital flow reversal episodes depending on how much GFSN financing was available to countries. Finally, this paper concludes with some avenues for further research on the possible evolution of the GFSN. JEL-Codes: F320, F330, F340, G010, H870.

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A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality

Cited by 10 publications

References 22 publications

The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility

The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility

Recent Trends and Ambiguities of Conditionality as an Instrument of the EU Internal Governance

What do we know about the global financial safety net? A new comprehensive data set

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