A Theory of Justice for Animals

Why “Animal (De)liberation” survives early criticism and is pivotal to public health

“…My commitment to speciesism is merely based on the view that the fact that individuals can be more or less closely related to one another genealogically matters morally. This flaw in Torres's understanding may have been fostered by his reading of Garner's work, who makes the same error where he claims that speciesism implies “that because an anencephalic infant is a human being … she has the same capacities as nonmarginal human beings.” Whereas Garner questions rightly whether the concept of “marginal” might be “offensive” when it is used in this context, (p177) a debate that I shall not pursue here, for the purpose of this article, I merely stress that speciesism implies only that anencephalic human beings deserve more moral significance compared to members of other species, rather than that they have the same capacities as other human beings.…”

“…Whereas Torres does not explicitly refer to Rawls to support his stance, his position seems to have been influenced a great deal by the work of Garner as he claims that this scholar would have “a more appropriate theory for a liberal society” (“una teoría … más apropiada para una sociedad liberal”) . (p210) The theory in question recognizes that nonhuman animals “are due much more” than a right “not to have suffering inflicted on them by humans,” but that nonhuman “animal advocates ought to direct their attention” to the goal of “eradicating the suffering of animals” as asking more than that would imply that one expects people to be “saints.” (p166‐168) While I am at one with Garner that the suffering that we impose upon other animals poses a moral issue, I also argued that it is inappropriate to seek to eradicate it. More importantly, I argued that significant political change for the better in relation to the consumption of animal products can only be expected if people balance the whole gamut of interests that are at stake in relation to the consumption of animal products appropriately, rather than focus merely on our interest in the limitation of suffering.…”

Death-Free Dairy? The Ethics of Clean Milk

“…In decades of animal ethicists and animal activists calling for veganism and the abolition of animal agriculture, veganism (and even vegetarianism) remain minority positions in the west, and, globally, the consumption of animal products is growing. Thus, it is worth exploring alternative possible futures, even if this is done through the lens of non-ideal theory (see Garner 2013). Second, it could be that milk itself has significant value.…”

“…3 My own sympathies in this debate lie with approaches to animal rights framed within liberal political philosophy, and especially with those approaches utilising interest-based rights (e.g., Cochrane 2012;Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011;Garner 2013). Like many other approaches in animal ethics, this perspective subjects the dairy industry to serious moral censure; more than this, however, it will likely frame the industry's practices as deeply unjust.…”

The political dimension of animal ethics in the context of bioethics: problems of integration and future challenges

“…He propuesto un marco de tales características en otra publicación (Tirado, 2016), aunque existen otras propuestas específicas que recogen distintos aspectos políticos de la relación humano-animal. (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011;Garner, 2013;Smith, 2012) Si es que la dicotomía 'humano-animal' debe hacer algún sentido, debe ser desde el reconocimiento de que nuestra humanidad es parte de nuestra animalidad. Esto, Como herramienta para el análisis, este marco relacional comunitario tendrá que ser capaz de poner de relieve las dimensiones éticas y políticas que surgen de las interacciones entre las comunidades humanas, los animales no humanos y el ecosistema.…”