1988
DOI: 10.3386/w2756
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A Theory of Managed Trade

Abstract: This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game setting facing volatile trade swings. High trade volume leads to a greater incentive to unilaterally defect from cooperative tariff levels. Therefore as the volume of trade expands, the level of protection must ri… Show more

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Cited by 187 publications
(243 citation statements)
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“…This evidence on the empirical relevance of the WTO and economic incentives for trade policy formation is therefore directly related to Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011). For temporary trade barriers explicitly, Bown and Crowley (forthcoming) also provide evidence from more disaggregated, industry-level data for the United States that economic incentives shape antidumping and safeguard policy use and thus US participation in cooperative, self-enforcing trade agreements such as the WTO, an idea first formalized theoretically by Bagwell and Staiger (1990). 4 In terms of our specific results, after controlling for this relationship between WTO disciplines over trade policy and TTBs, our evidence confirms an important counter-cyclical relationship between macroeconomic shocks and import protection over the period 1995-2010.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This evidence on the empirical relevance of the WTO and economic incentives for trade policy formation is therefore directly related to Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011). For temporary trade barriers explicitly, Bown and Crowley (forthcoming) also provide evidence from more disaggregated, industry-level data for the United States that economic incentives shape antidumping and safeguard policy use and thus US participation in cooperative, self-enforcing trade agreements such as the WTO, an idea first formalized theoretically by Bagwell and Staiger (1990). 4 In terms of our specific results, after controlling for this relationship between WTO disciplines over trade policy and TTBs, our evidence confirms an important counter-cyclical relationship between macroeconomic shocks and import protection over the period 1995-2010.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The political economy theories that account for unilateralism include Coates and Ludema (2001), Krishna and Mitra (2008), and very recently Ludema, Mayda and Mishra (2010) 8 The self-enforcing liberalisation model was first explained in modern terms by Dixit (1987) and Jensen and Thursby (1984); Bagwell and Staiger (1990) extended the model and brought it to the attention of the broad…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Export or import subsidies would not make sense, because both lead to a deterioration in the terms of trade. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1990), a trade policy aimed at exploiting the terms of trade should be based on the potential trade volume, and thus on the difference between Indian and RoW availability, rather than on RoW price. Although the simple rules are not designed to take into account the motivation for terms-of-trade manipulation, trade interventions are not negligible when price volatility is unweighted (see Table 5, first column).…”
Section: Storage By Private Stock Holdersmentioning
confidence: 99%