A Theory of Participation in Elections

Feddersen, Timothy; Sandroni, Alvaro

doi:10.1257/000282806779468571

Cited by 146 publications

(239 citation statements)

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“…According to the ethical voting literature (Harsanyi 1980, Coate and Conlin 2004, Feddersen and Sandroni 2006 voters decide on the ground of moral principles and they derive utility from adhering to them. The leader-follower theories (Uhlaner 1989, Morton 1991, Shachar and Nalebuff 1999, Herrera and Martinelli 2006 emphasize the role of leaders and their ability to impose sanctions or to provide rewards in motivating social groups to participate in elections.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting as a signaling device

2013

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting as a signaling device

2013

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“…This allows to consider a game between two players, the minority and the majority. 4 A similar degree of coordination is assumed in ethical voters models (Coate and Conlin 2004;Feddersen and Sandroni 2006). Groups preferences are defined on the minority/majority dimension: each group aims at maximizing the number of elected candidates representing its interests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems

Negri

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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Under open list proportional representation, voters vote both for a party and for some candidates within its list (preferential vote). Seats are assigned to parties in proportion to their votes and, within parties, to the candidates obtaining the largest number of preferential votes. The paper examines how the number of candidates voters can vote for affects the representation of minorities in parliaments. I highlight a clear negative relationship between the two. Minorities are proportionally represented in parliament only if voters can cast a limited number of preferential votes. When the number of preferential votes increases, a multiplier effect arises, which disproportionately increases the power of the majority in determining the elected candidates.

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“…Rule or group utilitarian models of turnout (see, e.g., Harsanyi [16], Feddersen and Sandroni [11,12], Coate and Conlin [6]) assume that individuals are ethical in the sense that they follow the rule that if followed by everybody else in the population (or their group) maximizes the welfare of the population (or the group to which they belong). Expressive voting models (see, e.g., Fiorina [14]; Aldrich [2]; Schuessler [30]; Hillman [17,18]; Degan [8]; Ortoleva and Snowberg [25]) assume that individuals bene…t from voting due to the utility they derive from self-expression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty

Degan

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout in an election with common value and uncertainty. Our model yields distinctive comparative statics results. First, an increase in the proportion of informed citizens may cause the winning margin for the right candidate to either rise or fall. In addition such increase can have a non-monotonic effect on turnout of uninformed citizens. Second, as the prior becomes more favourable towards the ex ante favoured candidate, turnouts of informed and uninformed voters both change in a nonmonotonic way. Furthermore, total turnout can be positively or negatively correlated with winning margins. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: D720.

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A Theory of Participation in Elections

Cited by 146 publications

References 0 publications

Voting as a signaling device

Voting as a signaling device

Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems

Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty

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