A theory of sequential reciprocity

Dufwenberg, Martin; Kirchsteiger, Georg

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003

Cited by 1,626 publications

(1,401 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Both economists and psychologists have also found negative reciprocity, for example, in the context of wage cuts (Greenberg, 1990;Kube, Marechal & Puppe, 2010). Several theoretical models complement these investigations (e.g., Cox et al, 2007;Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004;Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). These models capture the idea of reciprocity and predict behavior consistent with observations in these experiments.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 58%

The effects of time delay in reciprocity games

Neo

Weber

et al. 2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Reciprocity is common in economic and social domains, and it has been widely documented in the laboratory. While positive and negative reciprocity are observed in investment and ultimatum games, respectively, prior laboratory studies often neglect the effect of time delays that are common in real-world interactions. This research investigates the effect of time delays on reciprocity in the investment and ultimatum games. We manipulate the time delay after second movers have been informed about the first movers' decisions. We find that a delay is correlated with fewer rejections in the ultimatum game, but we find no effect of delays in the investment game. A follow-up study explores some of the processes that occur during time delay in the ultimatum game. We find delays correlated to increased reported feelings of satisfaction and decreased reported feelings of disappointment. Increased satisfaction is correlated to an increased probability of rejection, while disappointment has a more complex relationship to the probability of rejection.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 58%

The effects of time delay in reciprocity games

Neo

Weber

et al. 2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…This appears to come about naturally and has been observed in both the economics (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and the game theory literature, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The levels of cooperation after information we around 84% which is very close to the 86% level found by Andreoni and Miller (1993) in round 1 of their games where partners were able to build trust.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 70%

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

Shepherd

Balijepalli

2015

Transport Policy

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In this paper we model the competition between two cities as a game to maximise the welfare considering the impact of demand management strategies in the form of cordon tolls. This research builds on earlier work which studied the competition in a small tolled network meant for private modes of transport which have a choice of route. The earlier work showed that while both cities have an incentive to charge alone, once they begin, they are likely to fall into the 'Nash Trap' of a prisoner's dilemma where the incentive to defect is higher than that to cooperate thus eventually leading to a 'lose-lose' situation. The current paper extends the idea of competition between cities by setting up a system dynamic model of two cities which includes modes such as car, bus, train and walking and cycling. This paper innovates by integrating the simulation of land use transport interactions with a class room style experimental game and analyses the gaming strategies from a continuous repeated prisoner's dilemma involving setting of tolls to maximise the welfare of residents. The aim is to test (a) whether the strategies adopted are as theory predicts and (b) whether the players recognise the benefits of lower tolls when given information about the regulated solution and collaborate or continue to play to win. The results show that players respond to the information and maintain a collaborative solution which may have significant implications for regulation and the development of cities within regional partnerships.

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“…But they explained their findings with reciprocity dominating guilt aversion in that domain. Theories of reciprocity do not -at least in their traditional form (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004;Falk & Fischbacher, 2006;Rabin, 1993) -apply to my design. The receiver does not act.…”

Section: Appendix A: Exploratory Results Regarding Unrealistic Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Short Arm of Guilt: Does it Only Hit Who is Close?

Morell

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people's expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different minimal group identities in participants and randomly assign participants to one of two treatments. Senders either play a dictator game with a receiver from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I let senders condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, in the realm of realistic beliefs (i.e., the sender expects the receiver to expect the sender to send no more than half of the pie), the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much the sender sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. In both treatments, about half of the senders remain unaffected by second-order beliefs. In the ingroup treatment, unaffected senders identify less with their group than affected senders do. This is not true for the outgroup treatment.

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A theory of sequential reciprocity

Cited by 1,626 publications

References 41 publications

The effects of time delay in reciprocity games

The effects of time delay in reciprocity games

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

The Short Arm of Guilt: Does it Only Hit Who is Close?

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