A Theory of Social Order in Civil War

Abstract

The Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame has built an international reputation by bringing the best of interdisciplinary scholarly inquiry to bear on democratization, human development, and other research themes relevant to contemporary societies around the world. Together, more than 100 faculty and visiting fellows as well as both graduate and undergraduate students make up the Kellogg community of scholars. Founded in 1982, the Institute promotes research, provides students with exceptional educational opportunities, and builds linkages across campus and around the world. The Kellogg Working Paper Series: n Shares work-in-progress in a timely way before final publication in scholarly books and journals n Includes peer-reviewed papers by visiting and faculty fellows of the Institute n Includes a Web database of texts and abstracts in English and Spanish or Portuguese n Is indexed chronologically, by region and by research theme, and by author n Most full manuscripts downloadable from kellogg.nd.edu

Wartime Institutions

“…Social actors shape rebel strategy in various ways, as combatants have to react to authority structures, local norms, and social cohesion in their attempt to control civilian behavior (Arjona, 2013;Barter, 2014 (Peñate, 1999). The relation between non-state armed groups and the state is quite complex, as the former may influence, coopt, coerce or ally with public servants (Arjona, 2009;Staniland, 2012).…”

“…In such wars, rebels' modus operandi entails seizing control over pockets of territory, creating a growing challenge to the state. Although violence is a key means to achieve and maintain such control (Kalyvas, 2006), creating institutions to rule local populations is essential as well (Arjona, 2013). The mere creation of order facilitates population monitoring and increases the odds of voluntary cooperation, which is essential for maintaining control (Guevara Brian Loveman, and Thomas M. Davies, 1985;Kalyvas, 2006;Mao, 1978).…”

War and Poverty

“…In the available literature, such circumstances are usually referred to as state 'collapse' (Milliken 2003;Zartman 1995), and portrayed as resulting from or leading to forms of state 'failure' (Ghani and Lockhart 2008;Milliken 2003;USAID 2005). However, the collapse of 'government' does not necessarily have to be accompanied by the collapse of 'governance', rather it is accompanied by institutional changes as different non-state actors -rebel groups, militias, paramilitary groups, warlords, gangs, mafia, drug trafficking factions, private security providers and vigilante groups -gain the monopoly over the use of violence in contested areas (Arjona 2009;Gambetta 1996;Skaperdas 2001;Volkov 2002;Weinstein 2007). The actions of these actors have profound impacts on the socio-economic status and security of individuals, 8 This argument is akin to Olson (2000)'s distinction between 'stationary bandits' and 'roving bandits '. households and communities in the areas they control.…”

Behavioral Patterns among (Violent) Non-State Actors: A Study of Complementary Governance

“…For example, the Shiite militia group Hizballah reigns supreme throughout southern Lebanon (Levitt 2013); Tuareg and Berabiche groups exercise power and authority in various parts of the vast Sahel region of Africa (Kennedy-Boudali 2009: 4); on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, Muslim inhabitants commonly known as Moros or Bangamoro (the Moro nation) have contested the authority of the Manila government and its religious and cultural influence since the Spanish colonial period (Rabasa et al 2007: 4); and transnational criminal networks have significant power throughout the tri-border area of South America (where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil meet). Widespread concerns about the security implications of these developments have led to a significant increase over the past two decades in research on the intersection of governance and violent non-state actors (VNSAs) 2 such as rebel or paramilitary groups (Wood 2003;Kalyvas, Shapiro & Masoud 2008;Arjona 2010;Mampilly 2011;Staniland 2012).…”