A Third Conception of Epistemic Injustice

Nikolaidis, A. C.

doi:10.1007/s11217-021-09760-1

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Borrowing the term coined by Fricker [10] to denote inequalities in the legitimacy of groups and individuals to act as knowers, epistemic injustice can be seen on a wider scale as discrimination of groups not only in terms of their participation in knowledge production but also in terms of opportunities to achieve epistemic virtues through access to appropriate tools and resources [50], which can manifest as scientific literacy and technological aptness. Notably, it is interesting to consider Dan Kahan's explanation of a bad belief (a belief based on faulty data) as the result of cultural cognition [51].…”

Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this context, the phenomenon of informed ignorance intricately intertwines with the manifestation of epistemic injustice in its broader sense. This concept, taken here to denote the unequal distribution of knowledge and access to information, is emphasized by instances of selective ignorance [50]. Individuals or institutions, through conscious or unconscious mechanisms, may perpetuate epistemic injustice by marginalizing certain perspectives, thereby excluding some forms of information from common discourse.…”

Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

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Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

Cohen,

Garasic

2024

Philosophies

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Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, appears to be steadily spreading, despite the increasing availability of information. The notion of informed ignorance herein proposed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media. Linked to many of societies’ most looming catastrophes, from political polarization to the climate crisis, practices related to knowledge and information are deemed some of the most imminent and daunting modern threats, evidenced by the latest report of the World Economic Forum, which has named misinformation the most severe short-term global risk. This paper’s epistemic perspective links the properties of today’s information culture and the ways in which it interacts with individual capacities and limitations in current technological and socio-political contexts. Such a position is analyzed through the lens of epistemic principles as a contemporary epistemic phenotype that emerges from an environment of ill-adapted and excessive information inputs and leads to a distinctive type of social injustice that is primarily epistemic in nature. While equity and accessibility are widely discussed as important contributing factors to epistemic discrepancies, other overlooked but fundamental issues underlying epistemic injustices are considered, such as information manipulation, cognitive limitations, and epistemic degradation. To effectively face this elusive threat, we propose an inclusive viewpoint that harnesses knowledge from cognitive science, science and technology studies, and social epistemology to inform a unifying theory of its main impacts and driving forces. By adjusting a modern epistemic framework to the described phenomena, we intend to contextually outline its trajectory and possible means of containment based on a shared responsibility to maintain ethical epistemic standards. In a time of international unrest and mounting civil acts of violence, it is pertinent to emphasize the ethical principles of knowledge systems and authorities and suggest policy adaptations to maintain a social contract based on the shared values of truth and freedom.

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Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

Cohen,

Garasic

2024

Philosophies

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“…Providing patients with information that will help them get a more complete picture of their situation, a true belief, can be supported by a basic notion of honesty (p. 257, 265) [ 32 ] intrinsic to a relationship of trust (p. 202–203) [ 32 ]. Controlling the flow of information, for example by withholding relevant information may be a manifestation of power, making the one who is deceived in some way reduced to not being on equal terms with the one who deceives (p. 19, 282) [ 33 ], [ 34 , 35 ]. Believing that the physician acts for the benefit of the patient while what motivates the decision is also influenced by other factors, betrays the relationship of trust between physician and patient (p. 203) [ 32 ].…”

Section: Widening the Perspective: Shared Decision-making And Respect...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And knowingly allowing patients to develop such false beliefs could certainly be considered inconsistent with the ideal of respecting others as equals. The importance of information, in this case, is rather connected with norms implying that one must not intentionally mislead a person of equal moral standing because this is a form of epistemic injustice [ 35 ].…”

Section: Now What? the Old Problem In A New Outfit?mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Egalitarian Perspective on Information Sharing: The Example of Health Care Priorities

Lindberg,

Broström,

Johansson

2023

Health Care Anal

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In health care, the provision of pertinent information to patients is not just a moral imperative but also a legal obligation, often articulated through the lens of obtaining informed consent. Codes of medical ethics and many national laws mandate the disclosure of basic information about diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment alternatives. However, within publicly funded health care systems, other kinds of information might also be important to patients, such as insights into the health care priorities that underlie treatment offers made. While conventional perspectives do not take this as an obligatory part of the information to be shared with patients, perhaps through viewing it as clinically “non-actionable,” we advocate for a paradigm shift. Our proposition diverges from the traditional emphasis on actionability. We contend that honoring patients as equal moral agents necessitates, among other principles, a commitment to honesty. Withholding specific categories of information pertinent to patients’ comprehension of their situation is inherently incompatible with this principle. In this article, we advocate for a recalibration of the burden of proof. Rather than requiring special justifications for adding to the standard set of information items, we suggest that physicians should be able to justify excluding relevant facts about the patient’s situation and the underlying considerations shaping health care professionals’ choices. This perspective prioritizes transparency and empowers patients with a comprehensive understanding, aligning with the ethos of respect for the patient as person.

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“…I'm sympathetic to this argument, though think there are real reasons to avoid categorising knowledge or credibility – in this particular context – as something which experts by experience lack. For more on distributive epistemic injustice, see for example Coady (2017) and Nikolaidis (2021). Relatedly, Dotson's concept of contributory injustice (Dotson, 2012; Miller Tate, 2019) could be appealed to as a means of explaining how testimony subversions occur.…”

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confidence: 99%

Co-Production and Structural Oppression in Public Mental Health

Wilde

2023

Roy. Inst. Philos. Suppl.

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Co-production, in the field of mental health, aims to bring together academic and clinical researchers and those with lived experience. Often, research projects informed by this methodology involve the meeting of opposing attitudes, whether to the legitimacy of psychiatry, determinants of mental ill health, or the most appropriate interventions. This has meant that whilst some have reported positive experiences of co-production, many people with lived experience of mental ill health, sometimes referred to as ‘experts by experience’ (EbE), report harms which have taken place or been perpetuated during co-produced research projects. In the literature, nearly always, this is understood as a kind of epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker's sense. In this paper, I argue that whilst Fricker's view does provide a plausible explanation of what's at play, we can gain more insight into the structural factors which exclude EbE by applying a framework of epistemic oppression. By highlighting the systemic and structural factors which work to keep certain knowers and their contributions out of our collective epistemic resources, we begin to understand the enormity of the task required to redress injustices in our knowledge production systems.

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A Third Conception of Epistemic Injustice

Cited by 13 publications

References 29 publications

Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

An Egalitarian Perspective on Information Sharing: The Example of Health Care Priorities

Co-Production and Structural Oppression in Public Mental Health

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