A threat to tax morale: The case of Australian higher education policy

Abstract

This study investigated tax morale among a sample of 447 Australian graduates who completed the GraduatesÕ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey shortly after receiving their higher education degrees. Using structural equation modeling (AMOS), pathways are mapped out showing linkages from (a) the values that individuals hold concerning the kind of society they want to live in, through (b) satisfaction with government policy requiring students to pay fees financed through a government loan (HECS or the Higher Education Contribution Scheme), to (c) HECS morale, that is, an internalized obligation to repay the loan, and finally to (d) tax morale, that is, an internalized obligation to pay income tax. Also affecting tax morale indirectly are the personal experiences of the new graduates. Those who were dissatisfied with their university course and those who were in the process of repaying their loan were more opposed to HECS and had lower levels of HECS morale, which in turn, adversely affected tax morale.

Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation

“…We operationalized tax morale as the motivational posture of commitment according to Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005), (Study 1) and as voluntary and enforced tax compliance according to Kirchler and Wahl (2010), (Studies 2 and 3). In the first study, we examined the relationship between chronic social value orientation, on one side, and tax morale and intended tax compliance on the other side.…”

“…Participants filled out a tax morale scale consisting of 8 items from Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005). The scale measures the extent to which individuals express commitment to the tax system and the belief that taxpaying is socially responsible (e.g., ''Citizenship carries with it a duty to pay tax'', ''I believe paying tax is good for our society, and therefore it is good for each of us'').…”

Worker or Shirker - Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment

“…Holt and Laury (2002) sum up the number of relatively safe choices to measure risk aversion (0: highly risk seeking, 10: highly risk averse). Holt and Laury (2002) Tax morale General attitude towards paying taxes; Measured with eight attitudinal items scaled from 1 to 5 (1: very low tax morale, 5: very high tax morale) that are partly based on Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005); The mean of the answers is used as a single indicator (Cronbach's α=0.74).…”

Closing the gap between regulation and the community

“…The idea was exported to other countries, including the United Kingdom. The public, however, did not agree, as Eliza Ahmed demonstrated in a series of analyses of tax and loan repayment (Ahmed and Braithwaite 2004, 2005Braithwaite and Ahmed 2005). Students who considered the scheme unjust and who were less than satisfied with the education they received acted out their grievance through shifting the focus of their retribution from the government to the tax system.…”