A Threshold-Based Detection Approach To Detect Fake Access Points and Jamming Attacks on IEEE 802.11 Networks: Implementation, Results and Limitations

Abstract

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Preventing Attacks on Wireless Networks Using SDN Controlled OODA Loops and Cyber Kill Chains

“…As beacon frames are transmitted every 102.4 ms according to the IEEE 802.11 standard, Amoordon et al [ 56 ] suggested that a shorter interval may signify the presence of multiple access points broadcasting the same SSID. The approach, which the authors demonstrated as effective in limited tests, also required an auxiliary device to act as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).…”

EMI and IEMI Impacts on the Radio Communication Network of Electrified Railway Systems: A Critical Review

“…do not specify basic personal safety requirements for apparatus under fault conditions [77], [78] Modeling lumped equivalent circuits and transfer functions like EM topology [83], [84] cannot cover the frequency range, obtain proper transfer functions, and add any new parameters EMI issue from Pantograph-Catenary Arcing (transient disturbance EMI issue) [29], [85], [86] the only model construction for EMI issue and only based on GSM-R communication system Mitigation suppression techniques, including passive filter, Wheatstone bridge balance, active filter, and optimized modulation, related to hardware electrical equipment [87]- [90] unsuitable for the railway domain or the field of telecommunications Detection statistics-based and threshold detection (capture the temporal and spectral information with time and frequency analysis) [91]- [94] cannot analyze multiple indicators and distinguish attacks in real time IEMI classification methods, either binary or multiple classifications [95] efficiency is low and needs a long processing time with a huge amount of data Mitigation increasing transmitted power to increase SIR, switching from the train front antenna to the train rear antenna to increase attenuation, and using a high front-to-back ratio train antenna [73] Mainly physical methods to mitigate the impact and lack consideration about the specific telecommunication field in the railway systems [26], [96] in the above three spaces. Therefore, each disturbance generated in the EM environment interacts with the EMU and ultimately interferes with the OTCS equipment in HSR, as illustrated in Fig.…”

“…Current IEMI detection methods cannot analyze multiple indicators and attacks simultaneously based on statistics-based detection and threshold detection [91]- [94]. The research in wireless communications systems has led to the development of different classification methods, either binary or multiple classifications.…”