A tractable two-stage robust winner determination model for truckload service procurement via combinatorial auctions

Zhang, Bo; Yao, Tao; Friesz, Terry L.; Sun, Yuqi

doi:10.1016/j.trb.2015.03.019

Cited by 45 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…When the demand is uncertain and its distribution function is given, Ma et al (2010) constructed a two-stage stochastic programming model, and showed the effectiveness of the proposed model by conducting numerical examples with commercial branch and bound solvers. When the demand distribution is unknown, Zhang et al (2015) proposed a tractable two-stage robust model. After constructing polyhedral uncertainty sets with a data-driven approach, it conducted numerical tests to show the effectiveness of the model by proposing a reformulation solution method.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Winner determination problem with loss-averse buyers in reverse auctions

Qian¹,

Huang²,

Yu³

et al. 2017

Front. Eng

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Reverse auctions have been widely adopted for purchasing goods and services. This paper considers a novel winner determination problem in a multiple-object reverse auction in which the buyer involves loss-averse behavior due to uncertain attributes. A corresponding winner determination model based on cumulative prospect theory is proposed. Due to the NP-hard characteristic, a loaded route strategy is proposed to ensure the feasibility of the model. Then, an improved ant colony algorithm that consists of a dynamic transition strategy and a Max-Min pheromone strategy is designed. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm. We find that under the loaded route strategy, the improved ant colony algorithm performs better than the basic ant colony algorithm. In addition, the proposed model can effectively characterize the buyer's loss-averse behavior.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Winner determination problem with loss-averse buyers in reverse auctions

Qian¹,

Huang²,

Yu³

et al. 2017

Front. Eng

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show abstract

“…Combinatorial auctions have also been proposed for Internet pricing (Hershberger and Suri, 2001) and assigning contracts to private companies for meal delivery to schools (Epstein et al., 2004) and resource allocation in cloud computing (Samimi et al., 2016). In transportation and logistics, combinatorial auctions have gained attention for selling airport departure and arrival slots (Rassenti et al., 1982), truckload transportation (Zhang et al., 2015), city bus route market (Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006), and railway industry (Kuo and Miller‐Hooks, 2015). Collaborative transportation has gained attention as an effective approach to exchange transportation requests and save the cost (Guajardo and Rönnqvist, 2016; Gansterer and Hartl, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles

Takalloo

Bogyrbayeva

Charkhgard

et al. 2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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The introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) to consumer markets will expedite the trend of car sharing and enable co‐owning or co‐leasing a car. In this paper, we consider a combinatorial auction market for fractional ownership of AVs, which is unique in two aspects. First, items are neither predefined nor discrete; rather, items are continuous time slots defined by bidders. Second, the spatial information of bidders should be incorporated within the winner determination problem (WDP) so that sharing a vehicle is indeed a viable plan. The consideration of spatial information increases the computational complexity significantly. We formulate the WDP, which plays a critical role in various auction designs and pricing schemes, for both discrete‐ and continuous‐time settings. In terms of social welfare maximization, we show that the continuous‐time model is superior to the discrete‐time model. We provide a conflict‐based reformulation of the continuous‐time model, for which we develop an effective solution approach based on a heuristic and maximal clique based reformulations. Using samples of the 2010–2012 California Household Travel Survey, we verify that the proposed solution methods provide effective computational tools for the combinatorial auction with bidder‐defined items.

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“…They have been used widely across various industry sectors (De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Pekeč and Rothkopf, 2003; Milgrom, 2019) including allocation of the spectrum right licenses to telecommunication companies and Internet pricing (Hershberger and Suri, 2001). In transportation and logistics, combinatorial auctions have gained attention for selling airport departure and arrival slots (Rassenti et al., 1982), truckload transportation (Zhang et al., 2015), city bus route market (Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006), and railway industry (Kuo and Miller‐Hooks, 2015). Recently, researchers suggest combinatorial auctions in the ride‐sharing market for designing a more efficient shared mobility system (Hara and Hato, 2018), collaborative vehicle routing (Gansterer and Hartl, 2017), and public transportation systems (James et al., 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An iterative combinatorial auction design for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles

Bogyrbayeva

Takalloo

Charkhgard

et al. 2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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This study designs a new market for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles (AVs), in which an AV is co‐leased by a group of individuals. We present a practical iterative auction based on the combinatorial clock auction to match the interested customers together and determine their payments. In designing such an auction, we consider continuous‐time items (time slots) that are defined by bidders and naturally exploit driverless mobility of AVs to form co‐leasing groups. To relieve the computational burdens of both bidders and the auctioneer, we devise user agents who generate packages and bid on behalf of bidders. Through numerical experiments using the California 2010–2012 travel survey, we test the performance of the auction design. We also compare various bidding strategies and study the effect of activity rules on the bidders' payoffs. We find that the designed activity rules successfully remove the strategic behavior of bidders. We also find that core‐selecting payment rule brings the largest revenue to the auctioneer in most cases.

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A tractable two-stage robust winner determination model for truckload service procurement via combinatorial auctions

Cited by 45 publications

References 36 publications

Winner determination problem with loss-averse buyers in reverse auctions

Winner determination problem with loss-averse buyers in reverse auctions

Solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles

An iterative combinatorial auction design for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles

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