A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Online Knowledge Sharing Community

Yang, Jiandong; Yan, Xiangrong; Yang, Wei

doi:10.1155/2022/4460034

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In this paper, a three-party dynamic game model is established using evolutionary game theory for the medical-big-data-sharing scenario, and in-depth modeling and analysis are carried out. Compared with the assumption of perfect rationality in traditional game theory, evolutionary game theory defines the rationality of participants as finite rationality, which is closer to the actual situation [29][30][31]. Furthermore, we present fresh illumination and ideas for increasing the study of medical data sharing by numerical simulation of how stakeholders accomplish reasonably stable strategy selection with continual interaction and adjustment.…”

Section: Game Theory On Data Sharingmentioning

confidence: 98%

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An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behavior in Medical Data Sharing

2023

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In the era of big data, medical data sharing has become an inevitable requirement to improve the quality and efficiency of medical services. To advance the progress of medical data sharing and expedite the circulation of data value, it becomes crucial to examine the decision-making behavior of stakeholders involved in the medical-data-sharing process. To this end, we construct a three-way evolutionary game model applicable to the medical sharing scenario, analyzing the evolutionary trends in the selection strategies of data providers, the medical-data-sharing platform and data demanders. Furthermore, through theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, we explore the game equilibrium point of the system and analyze key factors that affect stakeholder strategy selection. The results of the experiment show that, in addition to data security, platforms and regulators should pay attention to the regulation and governance of the quality of data flows, which involves reasonable incentives–feedback–rewards and penalties. By strengthening the security technology and data governance system construction of sharing platforms, as well as promoting regulatory authorities to implement reward and punishment measures, etc., a stable state can be achieved in such systems. In addition, this article also proposes relevant management suggestions for medical data sharing in order to provide useful references for scientific decision making by stakeholders.

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Section: Game Theory On Data Sharingmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, simply building a medical-data-sharing platform with data governance capabilities does not guarantee efficient data sharing. From an economic perspective, medical data sharing is a continuous, multi-subject and bounded rational process [10]. Each stakeholder will pursue their own interests to maximize benefits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behavior in Medical Data Sharing

2023

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“…Li et al [21] proposed a three-party evolutionary game model for the spread of false information in social networks. Yang et al [22] proposed a tripartite evolutionary game analysis of network knowledge sharing community. Sun et al [23] proposed a tripartite game to stimulate trust and cooperation in marginal services.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite evolutionary game in the process of network attack and defense

Chen,

Fan,

Leng

et al. 2024

Telecommun Syst

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At present, the confrontation in cyberspace is becoming more and more fierce, and network attacks and defenses have become the main form of confrontation between parties in cyberspace. The maximum benefit can be obtained by using scientific decision-making. Traditional network attack and defense research mainly focuses on the relationship between network attackers and network defenders, but enough to explain the benefits of in the evolution of network attacks and defenses. In view of this, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among network attackers, network defenders and government regulators, analyzes Article Title the evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategic choices, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary system. The research results show that (1) the timely supervision of the network by the government supervision department is conducive to enhancing the construction of network security and has strategic significance for the security of cyberspace; (2) the network defense department can obtain more effective defense measures when being attacked by the network; (3) the network defense party can analyze the strategic defense requirements that are more in line with its own benefits. Finally, we use Matlab2021a to conduct simulation analysis, verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model under different initial conditions, and put forward reasonable suggestions for network defenders and government regulators according to the analysis conclusions.

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“…It combines Internet technology with traditional knowledge payment methods so that consumers can obtain high-quality knowledge content more conveniently and meet the needs of people to acquire knowledge in fragmented time [1]. Under the influence of the global shift toward a knowledge-sharing economy and the growing demand for knowledge products and services [2], it has developed rapidly as an effective method of knowledge sharing [3]. In particular, during the COVID-19 epidemic prevention and control period, the offline real economy suffered a huge impact, while the knowledge payment industry ushered in a new development opportunity [4].…”

Section: Introduction 1research Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decisions of Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Anti-Piracy Efforts: Based on China’s Knowledge Payment Market

Liu,

Luo

2023

Systems

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Knowledge payment is an emerging business mode that has developed in the era of social media. With the impact of Internet technology, the knowledge payment market is rapidly expanding, especially in China. However, piracy leads to more intense competition and affects the profits of knowledge providers and knowledge payment platforms. Government policies combined with the anti-piracy measures of these platforms have become effective methods to combat piracy. This paper investigates the impact of government subsidies and anti-piracy efforts on a knowledge provider’s and platform’s optimal decisions. We develop a two-stage knowledge payment product supply chain with a knowledge provider and a knowledge payment platform. The platform in the leader position of the supply chain has anti-piracy efforts and the government subsidizes the platform. Stackelberg game models are constructed and compared to examine the equilibrium solution in relation to three modes (no government subsidies and no anti-piracy efforts; only anti-piracy efforts; and both government subsidies and anti-piracy efforts). Our analysis shows that (1) both government subsidies and anti-piracy efforts increase the quality level and unit quality signing bonus of the knowledge payment product. Meanwhile, the product’s retail price increases with anti-piracy efforts but decreases within a certain subsidy range. (2) The knowledge provider’s profit always increases with the anti-piracy effort level, while the platform’s profit is an inverted U-shaped relationship with the anti-piracy effort level. (3) Government subsidy behavior can always increase a knowledge provider’s profit but may not necessarily increase the platform’s profit. Moreover, there exists a certain threshold: when subsidies are lower (higher) than this threshold, it is more beneficial to the knowledge provider (platform). In addition, we also find that the method of high subsidies combined with a low anti-piracy effort level benefits both parties and that the subsidized party will be more sensitive. The results will provide knowledge providers and platforms with new market management insights from the perspective of government subsidies and anti-piracy efforts and guide them to make optimal decisions.

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A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Online Knowledge Sharing Community

Cited by 8 publications

References 23 publications

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behavior in Medical Data Sharing

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’ Decision-Making Behavior in Medical Data Sharing

Tripartite evolutionary game in the process of network attack and defense

Decisions of Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Anti-Piracy Efforts: Based on China’s Knowledge Payment Market

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