A tripartite evolutionary game behavior analysis of the implementation strategy of the internal carbon pricing of enterprises under governments supervision

Wu, Kai; Bai, E.; Zhu, Hejie; Lu, Zhijiang; Zhu, Hongxin

doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e23131

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…After the Great Depression in the 1920s to 1930s, supervision proved to be an effective means for governments to address market abuses (e.g., fraud, or conflicts of profit), and the rationale for strengthening government supervision gained wider social acceptance [30]. Wang [31] defined government supervision as a variety of legal constraints and incentives that government administrative agencies with supervisory functions take on micro market actors based on public interest objectives.…”

Section: Carbon Emission Supervisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China

Liang,

Lv,

Zhao

2024

PLoS ONE

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Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.

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Section: Carbon Emission Supervisionmentioning

confidence: 99%