A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society

Zhang, Meng; Kong, Zhaojun

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2022.108132

Cited by 61 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Since then, scholars apply the evolutionary game theory more to the strategic interactive analysis of multiple stakeholders and achieve fruitful results. Zhang and Kong (2022) constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model about emergency‐supplied joint reverse to analyze the strategies of the government, enterprises, and the public. Fang et al (2020) discuss the effective incentive measures for electric vehicle infrastructure construction from the perspectives of the government and consumers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Han

Jin

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Carbon trading downstream, as a key strategy for decreasing carbon emissions, has the potential to hasten the entire society's decarbonization. Taking the government, household, and carbon trading management center as stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model, examines and stimulates evolutionary stability strategies, and then proposes some policy implications. Findings show that the downstream carbon market faces a complex evolutionary process. The promotion of the policy can be split into two periods: policy promotion and policy stability implementation. And proper household size management is a crucial and effective strategy to encourage downstream carbon trading programs and emission reduction.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Han

Jin

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Set the replication dynamic equation of enterprise and government to zero [ 71 ]; four partial equilibrium solutions can be obtained, namely

, and

. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix obtained from the equilibrium points are shown in Table 3 .…”

Section: Construction and Analysis Of Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

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As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

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“…Referring to the evolutionary game models in Awaga et al [32], Chen et al [42] and Zhang and Kong [43], the model simulation start time is assumed to be initial time = 0, the end time is FINAL TIME = 10, the unit is year, and the step size is time step = 0.1.…”

Section: Numerical Simulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Innovation and Green Financing in Platform Supply Chain

Liu

Peng

2022

Sustainability

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In view of the financing dilemma of green innovation of manufacturers in the e-commerce supply chain, we build a strategy evolution game model between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms and describe the dynamic evolution law of manufacturers choosing green innovation and platforms choosing green financing. Combined with numerical simulation, the factors affecting green innovation and green financing decisions are analyzed and strategic suggestions are put forward. The conclusions are as follows: (1) There is a unique evolutionary equilibrium strategy for dynamic behavioral decision-making between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms; (2) Green innovation and green financing are beneficial to both players of the game; (3) Whether the platform provides green financing services for manufacturers is affected by factors such as commissions, additional benefits brought by green innovation or green financing, and financing amounts. This paper enriches the research on green strategies for e-commerce supply chains, provides suggestions for green innovation and financing cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and further promotes the green development of the manufacturing industry.

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A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society

Cited by 61 publications

References 45 publications

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Green Innovation and Green Financing in Platform Supply Chain

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