A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the “regulation + target price insurance ” policy

Abstract

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, dealers, and ginger farmers under asymmetric price transmission and explores the impact of the target price insurance on the stabilization strategy of the tripartite evolutionary game. It is also demonstrated that farmers’ interests can be effectively protected under long‐term government regulation and issuance of reasonable insurance subsidy coefficients. Finally, the model is assigned according to the actual data to systematically reveal the factors affecting the decision of each actor. The research shows that: long‐term government regulation is necessary to effectively curb speculation, while the implementation of target price insurance can improve farmers’ trading position; the probability of government regulation and implementation is not only related to the cost and social benefits but also influenced by ginger trading volume, while the probability of ginger dealers choosing to hoard speculation increases with the increase of ginger trading volume.