A Two-Dimensional Approach to the Political Opportunity Structure of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe

Abstract

Previous studies on the electoral fortunes of extreme right parties (ERPs) have pointed to the importance of variables of party competition for the success -or failure -of ERPs. These studies vary greatly when it comes to describing the political opportunity structure of the extreme right. Apart from their methodological differences, existing studies differ especially with regard to the assumed underlying dimension of party competition. This article tests the impact of three frequently discussed variables in the political opportunity structure of ERPs (mainstream party convergence, position of the established right and party system polarisation) on the vote share of ERPs in Western Europe. In addition to examining previous studies in this field, it focuses on the interplay between the economic and the cultural dimensions as part of the political opportunity structure. The authors show that a decrease in polarisation with regard to economic questions is accompanied by a growing salience of ERPs' core issues, leading in the end to an increase in ERPs' vote share.

The impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on socio-economic policies

“…This divide exists in particular between their two traditional core clienteles, the anti-state petite bourgeoisie on the one hand and the traditionally left-leaning working class on the other (Ignazi, 2003;Ivarsflaten, 2005;Mudde, 2007;Spies, 2013;Afonso and Rennwald, 2017). In the face of these divisions, PRRPs are believed to follow strategies of 'position blurring', either presenting 'vague or contradictory positions' (Rovny, 2013: 6) or downplaying their socio-economic programme (Cole, 2005;Spies and Franzmann, 2011;Afonso, 2015), which some authors see as essentially subordinate to their nationalist ideology (Mudde, 2007: 119). However, such electoral strategies are of limited value once PRWPs are in office because their position on these matters becomes much more difficult to obscure, when laws have to be voted and budgets allocated.…”

Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short‐term Opportunities of Anti‐immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden

“…In contrast to Arzheimer and Carter's (, 422) definition, I do not refer to the programmatic strategies of mainstream parties or to the nature of party competition in an objective sense (cf. Abedi ; Kitschelt ; Spies & Franzmann ), but instead to how citizens evaluate competition between mainstream parties.…”

“…There are two main, partly contradictory, hypotheses about which elements of mainstream party competition generate favourable political opportunity structures for anti‐immigrant parties. The first highlights convergence between mainstream parties on economic‐distributive issues (Kitschelt 1995; 2007; 2012), while the second emphasises non‐material issues, particularly immigration policy (e.g., Ignazi 1992; 2003; Meguid ; Spies & Franzmann ).…”

“…Thus, empirical evidence relies on manifesto data (e.g., Arzheimer & Carter , 427; Van der Brug et al. , 553; Spies & Franzmann , 1051), expert judgment data (e.g., Lubbers et al. , 358; cf.…”

Organized for Parliament? Explaining the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in Post-Communist Europe

“…They showed how the programmatic strategies of competitors appear to be essential for the electoral success of radical right parties. By competitors earlier studies referred mainly to mainstream political parties that were competing with radical right parties on their core themes (Arzheimer and Carter 2006), on the economic dimension (Kitschelt 1995;de Lange 2007), or on both (Spies and Franzmann 2011). In brief, radical right are less successful at the polls when their message is covered by other competitors.…”