A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekçi, Mehmet

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007

Cited by 20 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Ekmekci et al (2012) showed that impermanent types would lead to permanent reputations, as well. Atakan and Ekmekci (2012, 2013, 2015 provided positive and negative results on permanent reputations with long-lived players on both sides. Liu (2011) provided dynamics that explain accumulation, consumption, and restoration of reputation when the discovery of the past is costly.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Order of limits in reputations

Dalkıran

2016

Theory Decis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known that these large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs rely on long-run players being arbitrarily patient. We study reputation games where a long-run player plays a fixed stage-game against an infinite sequence of short-run players under imperfect public monitoring. We show that in such games, introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. This holds true no matter how patient the long-run player is, as long as her discount factor is fixed. This result highlights the fact that the aforementioned large effects arise due to an order of limits argument, as anticipated. Keywords

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Order of limits in reputations

Dalkıran

2016

Theory Decis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Levine (1989, 1992) studied reputation in repeated games with one long-run player facing a sequence of short-run players. In contrast, the literature on reputation with two long-run players is very recent (see Cripps et al, 2005, Atakan and Ekmekci, 2011, 2012, 2013 We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounded memory and permanent reputations

Monte¹

2013

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…When one player's type is private information, the issue is cast as whether equilibria with low payoffs for that player can be eliminated; see, for example, Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Cripps et al (2005). More recently, there has been research allowing both players to have private information; see, for example, Atakan and Ekmekci (2008). Also relevant is work on relational contracts where, in a different setting and with a different mechanism than that modeled here, players learn to cooperate more effectively (while in our setting, they simply learn to cooperate); see Chassang (2010) and Halac (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

Harrington

Zhao

2012

Mathematical Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

a b s t r a c tIn the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players -patient and impatient -and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types -and this is common knowledge -then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they will cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.

show abstract

A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

Cited by 20 publications

References 6 publications

Order of limits in reputations

Order of limits in reputations

Bounded memory and permanent reputations

Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About