A Unified Presentation of Competition Analysis in Two‐sided Markets

Ribeiro, Eduardo Pontual; Golovanova, Svetlana

doi:10.1111/joes.12362

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 41 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Furthermore, the other direction concentrated on a comprehensive applications in different fields, such as male and female (Gale & Shapley, 1962;Bloch & Ryder, 2000;Irving et al, 2008), staff and positions (Roth, 1985;Azevedo, 2014), transaction suppliers and demanders (Sim & Chan, 2000;Jiang et al, 2011), students and colleges (Pais, 2008;Chui et al, 2020), knowledge matching (Chen et al, 2016), tasks assignment (Cullen & Farronato, 2021;Kadadha et al, 2021), competition analysis (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2019;Ribeiro & Golovanova, 2020). It is noted that the research in this direction are very fruitful.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making in Property Trading Platform: A Method Considering Intermediary Moral Hazard

Wang,

Zuo

2023

International Journal of Strategic Property Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Effective method of bilateral matching decision-making could drive the property transaction market more dynamic and healthier. In the property trade process, once intermediaries are conscientious, the portrait of matching parties are clearly described, a reasonable and satisfactory result can be got. However, the intermediary moral hazard and the loss of the description about the characteristics of matching parties can affect the matching result. By developing a method for a property transaction platform, this paper proposes a novel approach that considering intermediary moral hazard to improve matching efficiency. A mathematical model of intermediary moral hazard is performed, and then the price and other evaluation indicators of sellers and buyers are described by five different types of value forms. A multi-objective bilateral matching decision-making model that “minimizes the intermediary moral hazard in the case of the maximum benefits of the matching parties” is constructed and solved by the dictionary order method. A real case study of property trade platform is presented to illustrate how the proposed approach could be applied in practice. The results of this research indicate that the proposed approach is a useful tool for matching sellers and buyers under the intermediary moral hazard and has substantial practical application.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making in Property Trading Platform: A Method Considering Intermediary Moral Hazard

Wang,

Zuo

2023

International Journal of Strategic Property Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Furthermore, the other direction concentrated on a comprehensive applications in different fields, such as male and female (Gale & Shapley,1962;Bloch & Ryder, 2000;Irving et al, 2008), staff and positions (Roth,1985;Azevedo, 2014), transaction suppliers and demanders (Sim & Chan, 2000;Jiang et al, 2011Jiang et al, , 2015, students and colleges (Pais, 2008 ;Chui et al, 2020), knowledge matching (Chen et al,2016), tasks assignment (Cullen & Farronato,2021;Kadadha et al,2021), competition analysis (Belleflamme & Peitz, 2019;Ribeiro & Golovanova, 2020).It is noted that the research in this direction are very fruitful. In addition, recent papers explore how a platform should make matching decisions in dynamic settings (Banerjee et al, 2015;Hu & Zhou, 2018).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making Method Considering Regret Avoidance in Second-Hand Transactions

Wang,

Liang

2023

International Journal of Fuzzy System Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Effective methods of bilateral matching decision-making could make the second-hand transaction market and platforms more dynamic and healthier for development. However, the loss of description about the characteristics of sellers and buyers and the weight information of their inner preference can affect the matching result. By developing a method for a second-hand transaction, this paper proposes a novel approach that considers the matching parties' psychologies, which can improve the matching efficiency. A mathematical model of seller and buyer is performed, and then the price and other evaluation indicators of sellers and buyers are described by five different types. A bilateral matching multi-objective decision-making model is constructed and solved. A real case study of property trade platform is presented to illustrate how the proposed approach could be applied in practice. The results of this research indicate that the proposed approach is a useful tool for matching the sellers and buyers and has substantial practical application.

show abstract

“…Ref. [9] develops a unified presentation of competition analysis in two-sided markets and present quantitative tools to manage competition policy analysis in two-sided markets. For empirical studies that estimate various kinds of network effects in two-sided markets, see, for example, [10][11][12][13].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

Grossmann

Lang

Dietl

2021

JTAER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network externalities. In our model, two platforms compete with each other via a contest to dominate a certain market. If one platform wins the contest, it can serve the market for a certain duration as a monopolistic platform. Our paper shows that platform firms can compensate for cost disadvantages with network effects. A head start (e.g., technological advantage) does not guarantee future success for platform firms. Network effects and cost efficiency are decisive for future success. Interestingly, higher costs of a platform can induce higher platform profits in our dynamic model. Moreover, we find that a platform’s size and profit are not necessarily positively correlated. Our model also provides new insights with respect to the underlying causes for the emergence of market dominance. The combination of technological carry-over and network effects can explain a long-lasting dominance of a platform that benefits from a head start. The necessary preconditions for this emergence are convex costs, small network effects and high carry-over.

show abstract

A Unified Presentation of Competition Analysis in Two‐sided Markets

Cited by 11 publications

References 41 publications

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making in Property Trading Platform: A Method Considering Intermediary Moral Hazard

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making in Property Trading Platform: A Method Considering Intermediary Moral Hazard

Bilateral Matching Decision-Making Method Considering Regret Avoidance in Second-Hand Transactions

A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About