A unifying view of the basis of social cognition

Gallese, Vittorio; Keysers, Christian; Rizzolatti, Giacomo

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.002

Cited by 1,795 publications

(1,076 citation statements)

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“…According to some authors, mentalizing is a high-level mental process that is subserved mainly by cortical midline structures, especially the mPFC [e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006;Gallagher and Frith, 2003]. On the other hand, an increasing number of authors suggest that the TPJ has specific social functions of its own, in particular for identifying the goals or intentions behind behaviors, together with the aid of ''mirror neurons'' [e.g., Gallese et al, 2004;Keysers and Gazzola, 2007;Saxe and Powell, 2006;Uddin et al, 2007].…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mirror neurons in the motor and associative cortex of humans and monkeys discharge not only when specific actions are executed, but also when these same actions are observed in other animals or humans [Gallese et al, 2004;Keysers and Perrett, 2004]. They allow identifying the underlying goals of a biological movement, by matching the perceived behavior with one's own behavior, and the most common goals associated with it.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How does it work? As depicted in Figure 1C, single-cell recording studies with monkeys and fMRI studies with humans has revealed that the mirror system consists of a cortical structure involving the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) or parietal mirror system, and the premotor cortex (PMC) including the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) or frontal mirror system [homologous to the F5 in monkeys; Gallese et al, 2004;Iacoboni, 2005;Keysers and Perrett, 2004]. Visual information in the STS is propagated to the IPL ( 60% of the neurons in the monkey), where it is passed to the PMC ( 20% of the neurons).…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Overwalle

2008

Human Brain Mapping

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This meta-analysis explores the location and function of brain areas involved in social cognition, or the capacity to understand people's behavioral intentions, social beliefs, and personality traits. On the basis of over 200 fMRI studies, it tests alternative theoretical proposals that attempt to explain how several brain areas process information relevant for social cognition. The results suggest that inferring temporary states such as goals, intentions, and desires of other people-even when they are false and unjust from our own perspective-strongly engages the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Inferring more enduring dispositions of others and the self, or interpersonal norms and scripts, engages the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), although temporal states can also activate the mPFC. Other candidate tasks reflecting general-purpose brain processes that may potentially subserve social cognition are briefly reviewed, such as sequence learning, causality detection, emotion processing, and executive functioning (action monitoring, attention, dual task monitoring, episodic memory retrieval), but none of them overlaps uniquely with the regions activated during social cognition. Hence, it appears that social cognition particularly engages the TPJ and mPFC regions. The available evidence is consistent with the role of a TPJ-related mirror system for inferring temporary goals and intentions at a relatively perceptual level of representation, and the mPFC as a module that integrates social information across time and allows reflection and representation of traits and norms, and presumably also of intentionality, at a more abstract cognitive level.

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Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Perspectives On Social Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Overwalle

2008

Human Brain Mapping

1,556

102

1,300

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“…Viewing bodily movements activates the frontoparietal mirror system that matches action observation and execution 1 . This suggests that action understanding involves the mapping of observed actions onto the onlooker's motor representations 2 . Simulative motor mapping, however, seems to be insensitive to the identity of the acting body 3 .…”

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confidence: 99%

Representation of body identity and body actions in extrastriate body area and ventral premotor cortex

et al. 2006

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Although inherently linked, body form and body action may be represented in separate neural substrates. Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation in healthy individuals, we show that interference with the extrastriate body area impairs the discrimination of bodily forms, and interference with the ventral premotor cortex impairs the discrimination of bodily actions. This double dissociation suggests that whereas extrastriate body area mainly processes actors' body identity, premotor cortex is crucial for visual discriminations of actions

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“…This was an important breakthrough because it suggested a mechanism by which two seemingly different systems, the perceptual system and the motor system, could be linked. Some researchers have argued that mirror neurons help organisms understand and imitate others' actions (Gallese, 2003;Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004;Rizzolatti et al, 1996;Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), although the role of mirror neurons in understanding action has been a topic of some debate (Gallese, Gernsbacher, Heyes, Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011;Hickok, 2009;Jacob, 2008;Kosonogov, 2012).Some have argued that mirror neurons are responsible for all vicarious experiences, including vicarious experiences of action, sensation, and emotion (Gallese, 2003;Gallese et al, 2004;Iacoboni, 2009;Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). For example, Gallese's "shared manifold hypothesis," proposes that, within a mirror neuron framework, empathy should "accommodate and account for all different aspects of expressive behavior… to unify under the same account the multiple aspects and possible levels of description of intersubjective relations" (Gallese, 2003, pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

An appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences.

Wondra¹,

Ellsworth²

2015

Psychological Review

165

115

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Empathy, feeling what others feel, is regarded as a special phenomenon that is separate from other emotional experiences. Emotion theories say little about feeling emotions for others and empathy theories say little about how feeling emotions for others relates to normal firsthand emotional experience. Current empathy theories focus on how we feel emotions for others who feel the same thing, but not how we feel emotions for others that they do not feel, such as feeling angry for someone who is sad or feeling embarrassed for someone who is self assured. We propose an appraisal theory of vicarious emotional experiences, including empathy, based on appraisal theories of emotion. According to this theory, emotions for others are based on how we evaluate their situations, just as firsthand emotions are based on how we evaluate our own situations. We discuss how this framework can predict empathic emotion matching and also the experience of emotions for others that do not match what they feel. The theory treats empathy as a normal part of emotional experience. Keywords: empathy, emotion, appraisal, vicarious emotion APPRAISAL AND EMPATHY 4 An Appraisal Theory of Empathy and Other Vicarious Emotional ExperiencesWe feel sad when a crying friend's father has passed away. We feel embarrassed for our colleague when he blunders and blushes. We feel joy for our smiling friend when she succeeds.Empathy, feeling what another person feels, is pervasive, and it is a problem.Empathy is a problem because it defies our assumption that emotions are about our own personal goals (Frijda, 1988;Lazarus, 1991;Moors, 2010;C. A. Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Indeed, empathic emotions are described as more appropriate for someone else's situation than for our own (Hoffman, 2000;Preston & de Waal, 2002). Yet just as we feel emotions when we see a great work of art or step outside on a sunny day, we feel emotions for others when our personal goals are not involved.Emotion and empathy have been studied in isolation from each other. Theories of emotion neglect empathic emotions, and theories of empathy are full of special explanations for empathic emotions that are different from explanations for personal emotions. Nevertheless, empathic emotions are real emotions. They strike us quickly and redirect our attention just as any other emotion does and there is no reason to think that they are different from normal emotion processes. Bringing theories of empathy and emotion together explicitly can advance our understanding of both.We begin with a discussion of what is usually meant by empathy. Then we review and critically examine current theories of empathy. Finally, we present a theory of empathy based on appraisal theories of emotion. What is Empathy?We feel emotions about a wide variety of things. Sometimes we feel emotions because something happens to us. These are firsthand emotions. At other times we feel emotions because APPRAISAL AND EMPATHY 5 something happens to someone else. These are vicarious emotions. In some vicario...

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A unifying view of the basis of social cognition

Cited by 1,795 publications

References 59 publications

Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

Representation of body identity and body actions in extrastriate body area and ventral premotor cortex

An appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences.

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