A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game

“…Earlier such results in various different ways may be found in van Damme (1986), Howard (1992), Naeve-Steinweg (1999), and Trockel (2000Trockel ( , 2002b.…”

“…Binmore et al (1986), Serrano (2004)). Exact non-cooperative foundations for the Nash solution have been provided in van Damme (1986) [see also Naeve-Steinweg (1999) for a generalization], Howard (1992), ), Trockel (2000, 2002b.…”

“…The relation between implementation theory and the Nash program has been extensively analyzed and discussed in Serrano (1997Serrano ( , 2004, Bergin and Duggan (1999), Trockel (2000Trockel ( , 2002aTrockel ( , 2002bTrockel ( , 2003.…”

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

“…Howard (1992) argues that, due to a lack of Maskin monotonicity, the Nash bargaining solution fails to be Nash implementable. That a suitably defined Nash bargaining social choice rule is in fact Nash implementable has been demonstrated by von Damme (1986), Naeve (1999), and Trockel (2000Trockel ( , 2002b.…”

“…As we demonstrate in Section 5, the solution based choice correspondence ϕ ν does satisfy Maskin monotonicity. In fact, weak and full Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution based on social choice rules have been established in Trockel (2000Trockel ( , 2002b.…”