A VANET Anonymous Authentication Mechanism for Multi-level Application Scenarios

Wang, Xiaoliang; Jiang, Jianming; Wang, Baowei; Xia, Zhihua

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-00015-8_61

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Noting that the RFID usage is considered as mandatory in the implementations of the internet of things. Gope et al and Yue et al proposed anonymous schemes for authentication in VANET. Wang et al used aliases instead of the real vehicle identity where the CA does not keep a copy of this alias for revocation.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Privacy‐preserving authentication scheme for on‐road on‐demand refilling of pseudonym in VANET

Benarous

Kadri

Bitam

et al. 2019

Int J Communication

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Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) is fundamental because the user's safety may be threatened by the identity and the real-time spatiotemporal data exchanged on the network. This issue is commonly addressed by the use of certified temporal pseudonyms and their updating strategies to ensure the user's unlinkability and anonymity. IEEE 1609.2 Standard specified the process of certifying pseudonym along with certificates structure. However, the communication procedure between the certifying authority and the requesting vehicle was not defined. In this paper, a new privacy-preserving solution for pseudonym on-road on-demand refilling is proposed where the vehicle anonymously authenticates itself to the regional authority subsidiary of the central trusted authority to request a new pseudonyms pool. The authentication method has two phases, the first one uses anonymous tickets, and the second one is a challenge-based authentication. The anonymous tickets are certificates that do not include the identity of the user. Instead, it contains a reference number and the certifying authority signature. The challenge authentication is identity-less to preserve the privacy, yet it is used to prevent the misuse of tickets and the impersonation of its owner. Our proposed scheme is analyzed by the use of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) logic to demonstrate its correctness. It is also specified and checked by using the Security Protocol ANimator (SPAN) and the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tools. The logical demonstration proved that this privacy-preserving authentication is assured. The SPAN and AVISPA tools illustrated that it is resilient to security attacks.Road Side Units (RSUs) which are infrastructures with a wide transmission range that may be connected to service providers, authorities, or to the internet backbone. The network vehicles are considered as computers on wheels with processing units, storage capacities, sensors, network interfaces, etc. They communicate with each other via wireless Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC). 1 This communication is often referred to as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V). The vehicles also communicate with the RSUs and infrastructures via Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I). 2 These communications aim to exchange sensed data and to ensure safety applications. 3 The VANETs have some particular characteristics. Among which are that the vehicles have predictable movements that follows road restrictions. Also, they are highly dynamic. Moreover, they rely on the wireless exchange of clear state messages (Beacons). The beacons are required by the safety applications to prevent road causalities. They are broadcasted with high frequency, and they contain identity, location, speed, and direction data leading to a potential violation of the vehicle's confidentiality.Due to its direct impact on the user's safety and well-being, ensuring the security in these networks is fundamental. Various security risks and attacks exist in vehicular networks ...

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gope et al and Yue et al proposed anonymous schemes for authentication in VANET. Wang et al used aliases instead of the real vehicle identity where the CA does not keep a copy of this alias for revocation. Instead, it saves an encrypted copy in the subliminal channel of certificate signature which only it can read.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%