We consider a multi-player stochastic differential game with linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional depending on the variance and mean of the state and control actions of the players in open-loop form. Finite and infinite horizon problems with possibly some random coefficients as well as common noise are addressed. We propose a simple direct approach based on weak martingale optimality principle together with a fixed point argument in the space of controls for solving this game problem. The Nash equilibria are characterized in terms of systems of Riccati ordinary differential equations and linear mean-field backward stochastic differential equations: existence and uniqueness conditions are provided for such systems. Finally, we illustrate our results on a toy example.MSC Classification: 49N10, 49L20, 91A13. the cost functional depend upon the law of the stochastic process. This corresponds to a Paretooptimum where a social planner/influencer decides of the strategies for each individual. The theory of McKV control problems, also called mean-field type control, has generated recent advances in the literature, either by the maximum principle [5], or the dynamic programming approach [14], see also the recent books [3] and [6], and the references therein, and linear quadratic (LQ) models provide an important class of solvable applications studied in many papers, see, e.g., [15], [11], [10], [2].In this paper, we consider multi-player stochastic differential games for McKean-Vlasov dynamics. This corresponds and is motivated by the competitive interaction of multi-population with a large number of indistinguishable agents. In this context, we are then looking for a Nash equilibrium among the multi-class of populations. Such problem, sometimes refereed to as mean-field-type game, allows to incorporate competition and heterogeneity in the population, and is a natural extension of McKean-Vlasov (or mean-field-type) control by including multiple decision makers. It finds natural applications in engineering, power systems, social sciences and cybersecurity, and has attracted recent attention in the literature, see, e.g., [1], [7], [8], [4]. We focus more specifically on the case of linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional for each player (social planner). Linear Quadratic McKean-Vlasov stochastic differential game has been studied in [9] for a onedimensional state process, and by restricting to closed-loop control. Here, we consider both finite and infinite horizon problems in a multi-dimensional framework, with random coefficients for the affine terms of the McKean-Vlasov dynamics and random coefficients for the linear terms of the cost functional. Moreover, controls of each player are in open-loop form. Our main contribution is to provide a simple and direct approach based on weak martingale optimality principle developed in [2] for McKean-Vlasov control problem, and that we extend to the stochastic differential game, together with a fixed point argument in the space of open-loop c...