A year of South Sudan’s third civil war

Abstract

The new civil war in South Sudan began in December 2013. It soon proved to be a disaster for the population, a threat to the integrity of the world's youngest state and an embarrassment and conundrum to the international community. The article surveys the first year of this war. It outlines the course of military engagements, the consequences of the war for the people of South Sudan and the ways in which a peaceful settlement has been sought. During 2014 external initiatives and threats of sanctions were employed to prod the warring parties into a productive process, but with only limited success because each side entrenched itself while waiting for the other to collapse. Developments in January 2015 indicate that the time might be ripe for a negotiated settlement: the parties have reached military stalemate and negotiations have sketched the contours of a settlement. What remains is the haggling over the finer points of a political compromise. However, mediators and the parties must pick up the pace because yet another year of war will possibly result in the disintegration of South Sudan as a polity.

Ruptura Política No Sudão Do Sul: As Nações Unidas E Um Novo Desafio À Segurança Humana (2014 - 2018)

“…In this scenario, Rolandsen et al (2015) report that the fighting broke out in Juba and spread throughout the country, forcing the population to seek protection in the various UNMISS bases. In the face of violence, thousands of civilians were killed or fled from conflict areas.…”

“…However, despite the dialogue between the parties, James (2015) points out that the agreement was fragile and the aspirations it included to improve the management of oil lacked more robust control mechanisms. Consequently, the oil regions would continue to be a central point of friction, whether political or military (Rolandsen et al 2015).…”

Cyclical Youth-Led Conflict as an Early Warning Indicator

“…While conflict was confined primarily to the three states of the Greater Upper Nile region, many analysts consider this violence the outbreak of civil war recurrence in South Sudan rather than a regional rebellion due to the all-encompassing nature of the war (for an expanded discussion see Pendle, 2014). The dominant faction of the conflict is the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) headed by President Salva Kiir, who continued to maintain control over 7 of the 10 states in South Sudan and the apparatuses of government after the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 (Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli & Nicolaisen, 2015). However, the major opposition force, the SPLM-IO headed by Riek Machar, had been able to establish control within both the cities and countryside of the Upper Nile Region, presenting a significant threat within the country.…”

“…Tensions and fears that surrounded the upcoming national elections in 2015 resulted in the political tensions that plagued the SPLM throughout 2013 (Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli & Nicolaisen, 2015). Salva Kiir's leadership was being contested by Riek Machar, Pagan Amum (who is the former SPLM Secretary-General), and Rebecca Byandeng (John Garang's widow), who had all announced that they would run in the upcoming presidential election (Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli & Nicolaisen, 2015). The conflict that broke out in December followed a series of high-level dismissals, including of Vice-President Riek Machar, the cabinet, the Governor of Unity State, and the Secretary-General of the SPLM in July 2013.…”

Small and Far Between: Peacekeeping Economies in South Sudan

“…Within hours of the first shots, people in Juba, the capital, began to arrive at UNMISS compounds in search of protection. Over the next few months, compounds guarded by the UNMISS admitted more than 100,000 people in Juba and the three states (Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei) engulfed by the war (see Rolandsen et al 2015). In response to the new conflict and the increased responsibilities of the mission, on 27 May 2014 the UN Security Council revised the mandate and assigned more troops (United Nations Security Council 2014).…”