Abstract Entities in a Presentist World

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world.</jats:p>

On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

“…This theory, unlike Humean Supervenience, is neutral about ontological commitments to non-existent entities. The neutrality of presentism regarding the ontological commitments to abstracta is defended byFilomeno (2016), which mutatis mutandis holds for the Growig-block theory.…”