Accountability‐by‐Proxy in Transnational Non‐State Governance

Abstract

Transnational non‐state governance arrangements (NGAs) are increasingly common in areas such as labor standards and environmental sustainability, often presenting themselves as innovative means through which the lives of marginalized communities in developing countries can be improved. Yet in some cases, the policy interventions adopted by the managers of these NGAs appear not to be welcomed by their supposed beneficiaries. This article accounts for this predicament by examining the effects of different configurations of accountability within NGAs promoting labor rights. Most labor‐rights NGAs incorporate “proxy accountability” arrangements, in which consumers and activists hold decision makers accountable “on behalf” of the putative beneficiaries of the NGAs: workers and affected communities in poorer countries. The article shows how and why different combinations of proxy versus beneficiary accountability influence the choice of policy instruments used by NGAs, and applies the argument to three prominent non‐state initiatives in the domain of labor standards.

When Industrial Democracy Meets Corporate Social Responsibility — A Comparison of the Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as Responses to the Rana Plaza Disaster

“…But the risk is that diverging voices are marginalized and resulting policy instruments deviate significantly from those preferred by beneficiaries (Khan et al . ; Koenig‐Archibugi and Macdonald ). This underlines the importance of transnational co‐determination where recognized labour representatives participate in both the design and implementation of global labour governance.…”

“…CSR-based self-regulatory initiatives often seek to 'look like' more socially controlled initiatives and are thus 'remarkably similar in their organizational design, processes and rhetoric' despite lacking pluralist control (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009: 708;Fransen 2012). But the risk is that diverging voices are marginalized and resulting policy instruments deviate significantly from those preferred by beneficiaries (Khan et al 2007;Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013). This underlines the importance of transnational co-determination where recognized labour representatives participate in both the design and implementation of global labour governance.…”

Towards a Third Generation of Global Governance Scholarship

“…Ultimately, the politics of implementation demands that scholars seek to connect multi‐level regulatory systems to altering politics in a particular territory. With this mind, it is equally necessary that efforts to advance effective global regulation do not lose sight of the supposed beneficiaries (Koenig‐Archibugi and MacDonald, ). As Zürn (this section, p. 138) reminds us, there is an urgent need to pay attention to and ‘support the losers of globalization’.…”

Ethical Consumerism: A Defense of Market Vigilantism

“…At least where information about the expressed preferences of intended beneficiaries is reasonably accessible to consumers, they should be willing to take this information into account in making judgments about appropriate market strategies and should consider such information to provide weighty reasons for acting through the market in a particular way. 64 It is not difficult to find examples of past consumer campaigns in which some consumers have failed to respond adequately to the knowledge and perspectives of significantly affected groups, resulting in campaigns that have focused disproportionately on issues such as underage workers, while neglecting issues that have often been publicly identified by affected workers to be of greater concern, such as a living wage. 65 The practical implications of such obligations will be influenced importantly by the capacities of market activists to acquire relevant forms of information.…”