Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives

Abstract

The role of national representatives on the management boards (MBs) of European Union agencies (EUAs) is crucial in two respects. From a democratic point of view, national MB representatives' accountability may constitute a possible additional source of legitimacy for these technocratic bodies. From the perspective of European integration, their relationship with national institutions tells us about the status of EUAs and the extent to which their MBs constitute an intergovernmental control tool in the hands of the Member States. Contrary to their formal design, the collected data suggest that MBs have a rather supranational, technocratic character. With regard to their contribution to EUAs' democratic accountability, although the general level of accountability is high, the findings are more diverse. However, rather than reflecting control intentions by the Member States, different levels of accountability can best be explained by functional and institutional rather than strategic factors.

Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*

“…This finding could be interpreted in the light of studies of the MBs of national agencies, which show that even though MBs tend to remain flawed as account‐holders, their performance improves with time as they ‘grow’ into their roles (Schillemans and Bovens, 2019 , p.197). This should increase optimism that MBs can effectively serve as linchpins between EU governance and democratic institutions at the national level (see Buess, 2015 ). Additionally, the European Ombudsman is, in contrast to findings from prior studies (for example Wille and Bovens, 2020 ), found to be a largely passive account‐holder.…”

Mapping EU agencies as political entrepreneurs

“…Pre‐existing European networks, he argues, continue to dominate decision making in the aviation sector. Buess (: 106) also raises concerns about how extensive stakeholder engagement mechanisms really are, with an examination of six agencies finding ‘low levels of horizontal peer accountability’.…”

“…This research has examined the groups agencies tend to engage via survey and interview data, emphasising the centrality of the European Commission compared to non‐state actors (Trondal ; Egeberg & Trondal ). Studies also map formal arrangements for incorporating expertise from differing stakeholder groups in the form of consultation and membership of boards (Buess ). The focus has been primarily on evaluating whether these adhere to normative standards of legitimacy – for example, input, output and throughput (Schout ).…”

“…), and deliver effective policy coordination (Heims ). ‘Stakeholder engagement’ has been touched upon in studies of the composition of agency boards (Busuioc ; Font ; Buess ) as well as studies on how agencies function as centres of epistemic networks (Trondal & Jeppesen ). Entrepreneurship has not, however, formed a central focus of analysis.…”

The Influence of EU Agencies

“…Another strand of literature investigates EU agencies' relationships with the Commission, the European Parliament, the Member States, and stakeholders. Research on these topics has revolved around questions concerning EU agencies' networks, coordination, and legitimacy (Arras & Braun, 2018;Buess, 2014Buess, , 2015bHeims, 2016;Lord, 2011) as well as theoretical and conceptual explanations about inter-institutional relationships, following intergovernmental, supranational, and epistemic images (Egeberg et al, 2015;Trondal & Jappesen, 2008). From a policy-making perspective, furthermore, the role and use of EU agencies' expertise for the development of European policies have attracted scholars' attention (Ossege, 2016;Rimkutė, 2015).…”