2020
DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2020.1828951
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Accounting conservatism and the fulfilment of the target’s performance commitment in valuation adjustment mechanism contracts

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Behavioral finance theory holds that overconfident management is more likely to implement M & A activities, because people with irrational behavior characteristics tend to be blindly optimistic about M & A transactions and underestimate M & A risks [ 26 ]; it will also overestimate its ability to control market risks. In order to build a personal business empire, it is willing to pay a higher price than the assessed value of the merged enterprise, forming a higher M & A premium [ 27 ]; at the same time, it is overly optimistic about the operating conditions and performance capabilities of the target companies, leading to high commitments and increasing the risk of performance loss after mergers and acquisitions [ 28 ].On the contrary, if the acquirer shows accounting conservatism, it can increase the possibility of achieving the target commitment by reducing the commitment standard of the target company and increasing the post-merger supervision of the target company [ 29 ]. The feasibility opinions issued by independent financial advisers can enable stakeholders to fully understand the operating conditions [ 28 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Behavioral finance theory holds that overconfident management is more likely to implement M & A activities, because people with irrational behavior characteristics tend to be blindly optimistic about M & A transactions and underestimate M & A risks [ 26 ]; it will also overestimate its ability to control market risks. In order to build a personal business empire, it is willing to pay a higher price than the assessed value of the merged enterprise, forming a higher M & A premium [ 27 ]; at the same time, it is overly optimistic about the operating conditions and performance capabilities of the target companies, leading to high commitments and increasing the risk of performance loss after mergers and acquisitions [ 28 ].On the contrary, if the acquirer shows accounting conservatism, it can increase the possibility of achieving the target commitment by reducing the commitment standard of the target company and increasing the post-merger supervision of the target company [ 29 ]. The feasibility opinions issued by independent financial advisers can enable stakeholders to fully understand the operating conditions [ 28 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Song et al (2019) [ 33 ] argue the agency problem may incur an overly high-performance target of VAM contract in acquisition-the acquirer’s top management team may use performance commitment to send a positive signal to the market to serve their self-interests such as cash bonus while neglecting whether the standards can be achieved and thus damage the effectiveness of performance commitment contracts. Zeng et al (2020) [ 34 ]find the accounting conservatism of the acquirer to be positively associated with the target’s fulfillment of the performance commitments in VAM contracts; one reason is that the managers of conservative firms are more cautious, tending to lower the pre-specified performance standards to make them easier to fulfill and reduce the likelihood of asset impairment. Li and Li (2022) [ 35 ] find the acquirer’s CSR plays a positive role in the target’s fulfillment of performance commitment in the VAM agreement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%