Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa

Abstract

As the news of President Moussa Traoré's overthrow spread through Mali in March 1991, large crowds of people poured into the streets of Bamako, Segu, Kati, and other towns to exact retribution, culminating weeks of popular unrest. They went after prominent officials, military officers, and members of the wealthy élite that had prospered during the 23 years of Traoré's authoritarian rule. Customs and tax offices, traditional centres of high-level corruption and embezzlement, were systematically burned, their files taken of scattered, their staff put to flight. Big merchants, accused of collaborating with the ousted régime and benefiting from state favours, saw their shops emptied and destroyed. Though disorganised and apparently beyond the control of any leadership, the crowds carefully spared vital economic installations — but not the Bamako offices of theCaisse centrale de coopération économique(C.C.C.E.), seemingly tainted by its rôle as the main channel for French financial aid to the Government.

Remedying Africa's Self-propelled Corruption: The Missing Link

“…According to the World Bank, corruption is about 'misuse of entrusted power' and/or 'abuse of public office for private gain' (Kargbo 2006, 3). However, Adetula (2011), Harsch (1993, Philp (2006), Shore and Haller (2005) and Werlin (1994) argue that this definition of corruption is narrow and should include activities such as 'theft', 'embezzlement of funds', 'nepotism', 'patronage', 'abuse of authority', and conscious engagement in activities that involve 'conflict of interest'. Additionally, authors like Iyanda (2012), Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005), Nelke and Levi (1996) and Shore and Haller (2005) favour a more systemic and locally focused approach to defining corruption where issues relating to institutional capacity and cultural norms and practices are regarded as important contributors to its occurrence (Shore and Haller 2005, 5).…”

Íntegra da Revista

“…189 Additionally, in many sub-Saharan African countries, distinctions between the state realm and civil society are far from clear, evidence of low levels of relative state capacity. 190 One of the main problems is a loose coupling between the formal bureaucratic structure of these states and neopatrimonial forms of rule that suggest that personal relationships are more important than formal institutions in determining outcomes. 191 In discussing the neopatrimonial state, Jackson and Rosberg note that"[b]lack Africa's forty-odd states are among the weakest in the world.…”

Development or Decay? How Threats During Formative Moments of State Development Affect Institutional Quality Today

“…Referring to the powerful position of leaders, there is now a general consensus holding that any theory of the state must ultimately include the role played by the ruling elite (Goldsmith 2001;Jones and Olken 2005;Acemoglu and Robinson 2006;Williams and Doig 2004;Riley 1998;Klitgaard 1998;Riley 1998;Doig and Riley 1998;Harsch 1993;and Theobald 1990). According to this view, because of their powerful position, leaders are key to sustained institutional reform and, consequently, ultimately responsible for whether good or bad institutions are adopted.…”