Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Steinberger, Florian

doi:10.1093/analys/any094

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…But this constraint might not stem from accuracy-first epistemology. See Steinberger (2019) and the next footnote. In addition to Dorst's argument, see Easwaran (2016), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) and Pettigrew (2016b) for similar arguments in favour of the conservative account of epistemic value.…”

Section: The "Why-be-consistent?" Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications

Daoust¹

2020

Dialectica

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Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent.

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Section: The "Why-be-consistent?" Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to Dorst's argument, see Easwaran (2016), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) and Pettigrew (2016b) for similar arguments in favour of the conservative account of epistemic value. See Steinberger (2019) on why alternatives to conservatism are compatible with accuracy-first epistemology.…”

Section: The "Why-be-consistent?" Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications

Daoust¹

2020

Dialectica

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“…Why is the proponent of W ‐coherence allowed to place this restriction on the accuracy function? Arguably, they're not: see Steinberger (2019) for discussion.…”

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confidence: 99%

Accurate believers are deductively cogent

Hewson

2021

Nous

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This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multipremise closed belief set, and not a (merely) singlepremise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief-sensitive; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief-insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the beliefsensitive over belief-insensitive notion is defended, as is the choice of this particular belief-sensitive kind of accuracy coherence over other belief-sensitive rivals.Our conclusion is that accurate believers are deductively cogent.

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“…andEaswaran (2016). See also Skipper (forthcoming),Steinberger (2019), and Hewson (forthcoming) for critical discussion of this idea.…”

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confidence: 99%

When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups

Skipper¹,

Steglich‐Petersen²

2020

The Epistemology of Group Disagreement

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Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities : that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most pronounced. We close with a tentative proposal for how to solve the problem raised without rejecting conciliationism.

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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Cited by 11 publications

References 10 publications

Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications

Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications

Accurate believers are deductively cogent

When Conciliation Frustrates the Epistemic Priorities of Groups

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