In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.Within the past decade, there has been an explosion of renewed interest in goals and their effects on cognition, affect, and behavior (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996;Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990;Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986. Although much of this work focused on specific goal contents and their affective and behavioral sequelae, a major interest of contemporary theorists and researchers has been the various cognitive processes involved in goal-directed action. Individuals (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990;Weary & Edwards, 1996) working within this more recent tradition generally have viewed goals as cognitive representations of desired end states, and they have focused their attention on the cognitive processes and strategies used in the pursuit of goal attainment and/or disengagement.In addition to this focus on the cognitive bases of motivation and goal pursuit, several investigators (e.g., Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Gifford Weary, Jill A. Jacobson, and Stephanie J. Tobin, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University; John A. Edwards, Department of Psychology, Oregon State University.Jill A. Jacobson is now at the Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine.This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Research Grant SBR-970954I and by National Institute of Mental Health Training Grant T32-MH19728. Study 2 was conducted in connection with Jill A. Jacobson's dissertation research. Partial reports of the data for Study 2 were presented at the 1999 American Psychological Society meeting in Denver, CO. We thank Galen Bodenhausen for sharing his experimental materials with us.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gifford Weary, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. Electronic mail may be sent to weary.l@osu.edu. Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) have begun to focus on the possible implicit, or automatic, activation of goal-relevant cognitive structures. Thes...