Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement

Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic

“…Frustrated at a perceived lack of support from the Malian government, a small group of soldiers staged a mutiny, which unexpectedly overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012 (Luengo-Cabrera 2012: 13). Several Islamist groups that had been loosely aligned with the MNLA took advantage of the military coup and subsequent disorder to take control of vast areas of Mali's north (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). 4 As the relationship between the MNLA and the Islamist groups deteriorated, the latter pushed the former out of many sections of the north.…”

“…This is despite the fact that the capacity of the Malian state was limited, particularly in the north, and the legitimacy of the government had been contested in various ways since the country's independence in 1960 (Bøås and Torheim 2013). Intermittent conflicts resulted in peace agreements in 1991, 1992, and 2009, but none of these accords were fully implemented and governance in the region remained variable (Pezard and Shurkin 2015;Lecocq 2010). Systematic corruption, broken peace agreements, and increasingly hollow government institutions resulted in a state incapable of providing basic services beyond the capital region (Whitehouse 2012).…”

“…In 2012, a rebel coalition of several preexisting rebel groups in the north merged to form the Séléka (Sango for ' alliance'). 5 This 'heterogeneous consortium of malcontents' were united by their rejection of the existing government, their frustration over unmet peace promises, and a desire for spoils (International Crisis Group 2013;Pezard and Shurkin 2015). The Séléka began to march south and the feeble CAR military forces folded before them.…”

Realities and Myths of the 'Triple Nexus': Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali

“…As one study states, "[T]he armed groups involved in Mali's insurrections in each instance have never represented more than a small minority of the north's inhabitants." 43 In 2012, some Tuaregs even fought on the side of the GoM against the separatists. 44 An intervieweereferring to the outcomes of the Algiers Accord, which have arguably brought greater disaccord to the country, in particular, enflaming tensions between the political leadership, civilian populations, and the military-stated, "The Tuareg have never suffered as much, or been humiliated, as when Tuareg leaders claimed independence of the Azawad region.…”

Does the 2015 Peace Accord in Mali Reflect the Priorities of Households and Local Leaders?

“…4 Preceding the Accord on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali) (hereafter, the Peace Accord) of May and June 2015, four peace accords had been signed between the government and Toureg and Arab armed groups in Mali. 5 There are different interpretations as to why past peace agreements failed, ranging from the assumption that peace agreements had been used as cooptation strategies (Bøås 2012); that rebellions were mainly driven by internal rivalries as opposed to grievances against the state (Pezard & Shurkin 2015); that the government failed to follow through on its commitments (Wing 2013); that shortcomings of decentralization and democratization were at fault (Wing 2013;Pezard & Shurkin 2015); and the lack of representativeness at the negotiation table (Pezard & Shurkin 2015;Claudot-Hawad 1996). It is this latter issue that drives the research question of this paper.…”