Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification

Tucker, Chris

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.003.0003

Cited by 6 publications

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“…See BonJour (2003a), Chalmers (2003Chalmers ( , 2010, DePoe (2018), Duncan (2018aDuncan ( , 2018bDuncan ( , 2020, Fumerton (2015), Hasan (2017), Hopp (2011), andMoser (1989) for examples of how that might go. Critics of acquaintance theorists' approaches to explaining foundational knowledge include Ballantyne (2012), BonJour (1978, Davidson (1983), Huemer (2006, Markie (2009), McDowell (1994, Plantinga (2001), Pollock (2001), Poston (2010), Sellars (1963), Sosa (2003aSosa ( , 2003b, Tucker (2016), andWilliams (2005). 48 An alternative to thinking about foundational knowledge as knowledge of one's own experiences (as most foundationalists believe) is to think of our most basic perceptual knowledge along naïve realist lines as involving direct awareness of the external world.…”

Section: Duncan -9 Of 19mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See BonJour (2003a), Chalmers (2003, 2010), DePoe (2018), Duncan (2018a, 2018b, 2020), Fumerton (2015), Hasan (2017), Hopp (2011), and Moser (1989) for examples of how that might go. Critics of acquaintance theorists' approaches to explaining foundational knowledge include Ballantyne (2012), BonJour (1978, 1985), Davidson (1983), Huemer (2006, 2007), Markie (2009), McDowell (1994), Plantinga (2001), Pollock (2001), Poston (2010), Sellars (1963), Sosa (2003a, 2003b), Tucker (2016), and Williams (2005).…”

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Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

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To be acquainted with something (in the philosophical sense of "acquainted" discussed here) is to be directly aware of it. The idea that we are acquainted with certain things we experience has been discussed throughout the history of Western Philosophy, but in the early 20th century it gained especially focused attention among analytic philosophers who drew their inspiration from Bertrand Russell's work on acquaintance. Since then, many philosophers-particularly those working on self-knowledge or perception-have used the notion of acquaintance to explain various facts about human experience and knowledge. In this paper, I offer an overview of this work, with particular focus on the resurgent literature on acquaintance in contemporary analytic philosophy. After more fully explaining what acquaintance is (or is supposed to be), I describe some reasons for thinking that we are indeed acquainted with certain things we experience, and then I survey some of the facts about experience and knowledge that acquaintance may help explain. 1 | INTRODUCTION This paper is about acquaintance-an especially direct mental relation that we (allegedly) bear to certain things we experience, such as colors, smells, tastes, pains, and itches. This philosophical notion has received renewed interest and use of late, but it has also invited misunderstanding and skepticism. My aim in this paper is to dispel some of that misunderstanding and, hopefully, some of the skepticism too. Most contemporary philosophers who appeal to acquaintance draw their inspiration from Bertrand Russell (1911, 1912), who characterizes acquaintance as direct awareness. This differs from the ordinary sense of "acquaintance," as in "Hector and Paula are acquaintances" (or related knowledge attributions, such as "Hector knows Paula"). For one may be acquainted with something in that sense without being directly aware of it.

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Section: Duncan -9 Of 19mentioning

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Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

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“…Fumerton (2009: 72) specifically contends that infallibility 'gives one complete assurance of the truth'. Motivated by this infallibility thesis and the above observation on gradation, some epistemologists regard infallibility as gradable -for example, two persons can both be infallibly justified regarding their pains, while the one with stronger pain is more justified (Steup 2016, Tucker 2016, Fumerton 2009, 2018, Ballantyne 2012. Here is the puzzle: if infallible justification varies in strength, how can it always be absolute?…”

Section: Xiaoxing Zhangmentioning

confidence: 99%

The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance

Zhang

2021

Analysis

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The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by rejecting Fumerton's recent ‘semantic decision' solution. On Fumerton's suggestion, the putative gradation of infallible justifications is essentially semantic. It concerns only how we use the relevant term but not how well we perceive the truth. Regardless of its intuitive appeal, Fumerton's solution does not cover all the related situations. There is an irreducibly epistemic sense in which infallible justifications vary in degrees.

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Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification

Stoutenburg

2018

Erkenn

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Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Acquaintance

Acquaintance

The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance

Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification

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