Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

Abstract

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use.(ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-yearold children solved the problem much faster than 6 -7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children. q

Making Sense by Building Sense: Kindergarten Children’s Construction and Understanding of Adaptive Robot Behaviors

“…The research literature refers to a number of dyads describing people's stance toward artifacts: animate or human-like intention versus inanimate technological purpose (Ackermann 1991;Turkle 1984;Scaife and van Duuren 1995;Okita and Schwartz 2006;Bernestein and Crowley 2008;Jipson and Gelman 2007); function versus mechanism (Piaget and Inhelder 1972;Granott 1991;Metz 1991;Levy and Mioduser 2008); function versus physical appearance (Kemler Nelson and 11 Swarthmore College Students 1995; Diesendruck et al 2003) and original (designer's) intended function versus current function (Bloom 1996;Matan and Carey 2001;Defeyter 2003).…”

The supernatural guilt trip does not take us far enough

“…(Imagine an evolutionary biologist hypothesizing about the special purpose of a specific heart of a specific organism of all the possible such organisms within a given species.) Even for artifacts, teleo-functional judgments for class categories (e.g., CHAIR) appear to trump within-category exemplars (e.g., both a gothic revival style and a Chinoisserie style chair are "for sitting" although they may differ in design for posturing the body), and rarely occur within the exemplar class itself (e.g., the special purpose of an individual Chinoisserie style chair) (Defeyter & German 2003).…”

“…For younger children, the idea that "God did it," appears to be loosely associated knowledge, not yet integrated into a conceptual structure (Evans 2001), suggesting that "testimony" (Harris & Koenig 2006) plays a crucial role in early God concepts. In sum, God as intelligent designer is a complex (albeit possibly naturally developing), not an effortless, idea, which becomes firmly rooted only at the point when children reliably confront existential questions and fully understand the role of human artifice (Evans 2005; see also Defeyter & German 2003).…”

Action experience alters 3-month-old infants' perception of others' actions

“…Sensitivity to the goal structure of action also plays a powerful role in mediating learning across a variety of domains. Goal understanding guides early word learning (Baldwin & Moses, 2001;Woodward, in press), governs toddlers' social learning and problem-solving attempts (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998;Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002;Meltzoff, 1995) and informs children's understanding of cultural instruments and artifacts (Bloom & Markson, 1998;Defeyter & German, 2003).…”